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I

{
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Woo-Sung Koh, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1982
This thesis has attempted quantitatively to establish
a positive relationship between political leadership and
national development in South Korea during the period from
19^8 to 1982.
The major concepts used in this study are political
leader (President or Prime Minister), task elite (Cabinet
Minister), and national development (political stability
and socio-economic development).

The social background

data of the South Korean cabinet ministers were obtained
from newspapers, journal articles, and biographical
dictionaries.
Since the inception of the Republic of Korea in 19^8,
the various regimes have contributed to bring about South
Korea's success with national development.
records have varied.

However, their

Their differences in achievement are

a function of different political leaderships caused by
changes in political leaders' values and developmental
orientations and the consequent changes in the patterns of
their task elites recruitment and national development.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the
relationship between leadership change and the pattern of
national development in the Republic of Korea.
Since liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 19^5»
Korea has experienced much political change and instability
including American military occupation in South Korea and
the territorial division of Korean peninsula (1945-1948);
a devastating war between South and North Korea (19501953)» a Student Revolution (i960); a Military Revolution
(1961); Revitalizing Reforms (1972); and lastly the
assassination of President Park Chung-Hee (1979) (Wade and
Kim, 1978s 15)•

However, since 1961, South Korea has

shown an unprecedented growth as a nation, shedding the
old image of a 'have-not' and 'not-viable' politicoeconomic entity.

Average annual growth rate of GNP per

capita in 1970-79 was 10.6 percent.

In 1979» South Korea

achieved a per capita GNP of $1,624 together with an export
total of $15.1 billion.
growth.

It is a remarkable record of

Per capita income had by 1979 increased 7 times

since 1970, and some 20 times since i960, while exports
1
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had grown 17 times since 1970, which was a prodigious 460
times more than the i960 level.

In the process, South

Korea has been able to transform itself from an under
developed agrarian society to a rapidly industrializing
middle income country.

It has also become more urban.

Indeed, never before in the history of modernization has
a nation effected such a rapid change in its super- and
infra-structures.

To be sure, South Korea has become a

showcase among the developing nations in bringing about
a rapid economic growth and maintaining socio-political
stability (Kim and Kang, 1978s i; Kim, 198O: 32; Kim,
1981s 14-15).
There are many reasons behind this success story of
South Korea.

They could include technical innovation, new

market demands, findings of new resources, organizational
changes, role differentiations in bureaucracy, political
leadership, internal stability, foreign aid policy,
educational development and skilled manpower, value
changes of the population, national problems faced, both
physical and social infrastructures provided in the
1950s,;.. and so on.

Particularly significant, however, is

the input of national development planning by political
leadership (Whang, 1970: 4-5).

This leadership aspect in

South Korea's national development will be investigated
in this thesis.
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Theoretical Background
According to Edward Shils, "no new state can modernize
itself and remain or become liberal and democratic without
an elite with force of character, intelligence and high
moral qualities" (Lee, 19681 182).

Tsurutani (1973* 27)

also points out, "Because political leadership determines
goals, selects methods, and gives direction, society
develops or fails to develop according to the extent to
which its political leadership is intelligent, creative,
skillful, and committed.

Without this requisite function

of political leadership, there is no progress, no
direction, no development."
In the transitional countries, the question of
political leadership has been studied in the context of
nation building and modernization of traditional societies.
After World War II, when many of the developing countries
emerged from colonial rule, the political leadership
realized that political freedom without freedom from
economic, social and cultural backwardness was meaningless.
Thus, the breakthrough to modernity was conceived by the
political leadership as the strategic path to economic and
social freedom after the achievement of political
independence.

In this perspective of nation building and

modernization, the role of political leaders is critical
for the smooth transition from the traditional to the
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m o d e m societies.

For one thing, it involves the

dissemination of new values consistent with modernization
and the evolution of new institutions and structures that
would embody this new set of values (de Souza, 1978: 1).
However, the concept of national development remains
elusive and it is without any clear and well-defined
meaning.

Economists see national development primarily

in terms of man's application of technology to the control
of nature's resources in order to bring about a marked
increase in per capita GNP.

Sociologists and social

anthropologists are concerned with characteristics that
differentiate the m o d e m societies from the traditional.
Political scientists are interested not only in the
question of who exercises power but also in how
governments increase their capacity to innovate change,
respond to demands for change, and cope with social
conflicts, focusing on the problems of nation building
(Lee, 1971*. 13 ).
For this thesis, national development can be defined
as a process of acquiring a sustained growth of a system's
capability to cope with new, continuous changes toward the
achievement of progressive political, economic, and social
objectives.

Here, national development is seen as both

process and goal.

The term "modernization" is used

interchangeably with the term "national development" (Lee,

1968*

^ -

5) .
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As a goal, national development is the desired future
state of affairs - a politically, socially, and economi
cally integrated society with "built-in capacities for
continuous adaptation and growth, and regularized processes
and methods for the resolution of conflict and the
generation of change.

Its essential feature is stability

(Tsurutani, 1973* 5).
As a process, national development is a series of
complex and novel changes - economic, social, and political
- to be brought about by the application of m o d e m
industrial and organizational technologies and by the
skills, imagination, and resolve of political leadership.
Its essential feature is instability (Tsurutani, 1973* 6).
The modernization process, as the bridge between
m o d e m and traditional societies, implies the following
nine characteristics.

These characteristics ares

1) a

revolutionary process; 2 ) a complex process; 3) a systemic
process; k) a global process; 5 ) a lengthy process; 6 ) a
phased process; 7 ) a homogenizing process; 8 ) an irrevers
ible process; and 9) a progressive process (Black, 1976:
30-31).

In other words, national development involves

more than just industrialization and democratization.

As

a historical-evolutionary process, national development
process is seen as a complex set of interrelated processes
which could be viewed by different social strata of the
people of various countries in quite different ways.
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Thus, choices must he made by the political leadership of
the newly emerging nations for development purposes
(Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1965* 805-80?).
When traditional societies are initially confronted
by modernity, and when some of their prominent members
become the advocates of a new and challenging way of life,
the political leaders may adopt one of a variety of
courses.

They may combat the new ideas and persecute the

innovators as heretics; or they may discuss, then accept
some and reject others; or they may find them to be valid
and attempt a fundamental reorganization of their institu
tions accordingly (Black, 1966: 68-69).

Thus, the role

of political leadership is indeed the most crucial factor
to be ascertained in the process of modernization.
Political leadership is a directing center of all
actions and decisions pertaining to the national develop
ment.

Dynamism, change, industrialization, independence,

influence, power, internal unity:

these are some of the

attributes of m o d e m societies and many developing states
have been trying to achieve them.

Their political leaders

have sought to refasion their old societies and to pattern
the changes on the successful experiences of other
countries (Welch, Jr. (Ed.), 1967: 2).
In the process of national development, political
leadership performs a number of roles rather than a single
role.

These roles depend on which goals political leaders
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wish to achieve or which issues are most salient for the
society at the time.
In most transitional societies, nation building and
socio-economic progress are two fundamental and interre
lated goals of national development.

It requires the

improvement of the capital equipment of the economy, the
enhancement of the symbolic grandeur of the society, the
creation of national unity, the furtherance of an indige
nous m o d e m culture, and the operation of a set of modern
political institutions (Shils, 1964-: 116).
To deal with these overriding goals, according to
Esman (1966s 61-64-), political leadership must cope with
a series of major tasks:

1) achieving security against

external aggression and ensuring internal order; 2)
establishing and maintaining consensus on the legitimacy
of the regime; 3 ) integrating diverse ethnic, religious,
communal, and regional elements into a national political
community; 4-) organizing and distributing formal powers
and functions among the organs of central, regional, and
local governments and between public authority and the
private sector; 5 ) displacement of vested traditional
social and economic interests; 6 ) development of modern
izing skills and institutions; 7) fostering of psycholog
ical and material security; 8 ) mobilization of savings
and of current financial resources; 9 ) rational program
ming of investment; 10) efficient management of facilities
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and services; 11) activating participation in modernizing
activities, especially in decision-making roles; and 12)
achieving a secure position in the international community.
These tasks are test performed through systematic
development planning.

Development planning refers to

deliberate, rational, continuous efforts by political
leadership to accelerate the process of development and to
channel it into desired directions by means of the
comprehensive and detailed choices of objectives and the
determination and allocation of the resources necessary
for their achievement.

It is comprised of five components:

1) definition of the purposes for which development is
being undertaken; 2 ) determination of the resources
actually and potentially available for achieving the
specific goals and targets of the development plan; 3)
selection of the means whereby resources can be mobilized
to achieve the specific goals and targets; *0 formulation
of specific programs within the general plan; and 5 )
provision for its implementation (Colm and Geiger, 1962:
46-52).
In this study, the major concepts are political leader
(independent variable), task elite (intervening variable),
and national development (dependent variable).

Specifi

cally., the variables which are being utilized are
political priority, value, attitude, and development
plan. The term "political elite" or "elites" can be used
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synonymously with "political leadership."

Political

leadership means the "body of topmost decision-makers with
legal and/or actual responsibility.

In operational:*

terms, it can be divided into two subcategoriess
political leader and task elite.

Political leader means

the chief executive - President or Prime Minister.

Task

elite is a member of the State Council - the Cabinet
Minister.

The variables of national development used in

this study include political stability and socio-economic
development.
Hypotheses
Successful undertaking of the task of national
development calls for the generation and maintenance of
two vital phenomena:

stability and change.

In the

absense of stability, no meaningful long-range programs of
social reform can be implemented.

Social engineering is

impossible in a condition of chaos.

On the other hand,

programs of change and reform have a natural tendency to
disrupt and undermine stability.

Thus, how to promote

change, hence modernization, while still maintaining
stability, is the most crucial problem for any developing
country.

It is indeed the central task for political

leadership, for it is political leadership alone that can
mediate these two necessary but often incongruent
requirements for national development by rendering them
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mutually reenforcing.

In other words, the capacity for

national development lies ultimately in its political
leadership's manipulative skill in, creative intelligence
for, and unwavering commitment to, generating and main
taining stability on the one hand; and effectively
mobilizing and creatively utilizing the human and material
resources that exist in society for the task of national
development on the other (Tsurutani, 1973* 32).
In this perspective, the central hypothesis of this
study is that political leadership is the ultimate
determinant of South Korea's success with national
development.

Relationship between leadership changes and

changes in the development pattern will be examined during
the period from 19^8 to 1982.

Leadership changes involve

not only personnel changes but also concomitant changes in
the values and developmental orientations of political
leadership.
The hypothesis is further elaborated as follows:
Hypothesis-1.

Political leadership is a critical

variable in national development in the Republic of Korea.
Since the inception of the Republic of Korea in 19^8,
the various regimes have attempted to bring about economic
prosperity and democracy to the country.
records have varied.

However, their

Their differences in achievement

are a function of different political leadership.
Political leadership here means incumbents of key
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governmental politions.
Hypothesis-2.

There is a significant association

between social background of task elites and elite
recruitment patterns of political leaders in the Republic
of Korea.
The various quantitative studies of Korean political
leadership (Bark, 1967? Choi, 197^? Chung and Pae, 1977?
Hahn and Kim, 1976; Hahn and Kim, 196^; Han, 1973? Han,
1975? Kihl, 1976; Kihl and Kim, 1976; Kim and Woo, 1976;
Kim and Pai, 1980; lee, 1968; Lee, 197^; Lee and Bark,
1975; Whang, 1970) have shown changes in the pattern of
and the criteria for elite recruitment in the five regimes
which South Korea has had.

They have also shown changes

in their values and attitudes.

This hypothesis expects

that the social backgrounds of task elites closely reflect
the values and attitudes of the political leaders.
Hypothesis-3.

There is a significant relationship

between the values and attitudes of political leadership
and the patterns of national development in the Republic
of Korea.
Lester G. Seligman (1971* 2b0-bl) sees elite recruit
ment pattern as both reflecting and affecting the social
system.

As an indicator of development and change, elite

recruitment illuminates various changes in the social
systemt

economic changes, political structure, and the

level of politicization.

This hypothesis shows that
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change in political leaders' values and attitudes and in
their task elite recruitment patterns will bring about
corresponding different phases of the development process
in South Korea.

Change is defined as differences in

quality and quantity over time.
The Data and the Method of Analysis
The first hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) deals with the
performance of political elites in achieving political
stability and socio-economic development in South Korea.
The origin, nature, and purpose of national development in
South Korea will be analyzed to test this hypothesis.

The

five different administrations which South Korea has had
will be compared.

Investigated will be such questions ass

1) who the political elites have been; 2 ) what their
achievements have been; and 3) what reciprocal effects 1)
and 2 ) have had upon the political structure and socio
economic development.
To test the second hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), a
quantitative analysis will be necessary.

The data used in

this study were initially collected by Professors C. I.
Eugene Kim and John P. Lovell.

The data were obtained

from newspapers, journal articles, and biographical
dictionaries.

Their information includes such variables

as Year of Birth, Place of Birth, Education, Foreign
Travel and Residence, Occupation, and Party Affiliation.
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The theoretical model of this study is adopted from
Frederick W. Frey's The Turkish Political Elite.
During the period from 19^8 to 1982, various forms of
government have existed in South Korea.

But, to facilitate

my study, they can be divided into two types of government:
civilian regime and military regime.

Focusing on the

social backgrounds of their cabinet ministers, this section
of the study will inquire into such questions as:

1) what

sorts of persons have reached the cabinet level of power?
2 ) what differential changes have been responsible for
their rise in power; and 3) whether or not the task elites
do /differ in the social backgrounds in the two regimes civilian and military.
To answer these questions, the various social
background items will be tabulated as much as possible to
learn which characteristics will be regularly associated
with each other.

Then the change and continuity in their

composition in the two regimes-; will be compared, and
finally different patterns of task elite recruitment by
political leaders will be explored.
Hypothesis-3 deals with how different leadership
values and attitudes influence the patterns of national
development in South Korea.

To test this hypothesis, this

thesis will try to answer such questions as:

1) did

political elites from divergent social backgrounds exhibit
significantly different types of political priority; and
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2 ) was there any clear association between the distinctive
leadership values and attitudes and measure of economic
development.

The different national development process

of the two types of regimes will be also compared, using
the time-orientation approach advanced by Hahn-Been Lee
in his Korea:

Time, Change, and Administration.
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CHAPTER II
ROK POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AS MODERNIZER
In this chapter, the origin, nature, and purpose of
national development in South Korea will be analyzed and
the five different administrations which South Korea has
had, since its independence in 1948, will be compared.
Political Stability
Since the Liberation of 19451 the political pendulum
of South Korea has swung back and forth three timess

from

a representative-oriented system to an executive-dominant
system during the First Republic (1948-60); reemergence of
a representative-dominant model during the Second Republic
(1960-61); and reappearance of the executive-controlled
system since 1961.

During this period, South Korea has

also had eight constitutional changes and five different
Republics (Kim and Cho, 1972: vi).
When Korea was liberated from Japanese colonialism by
the sillied powers in 1945» the southern half of the Korean
peninsula that was occupied by U.S. forces experienced the
wholesale importation of Western democratic concepts.

The

first Constitution in 1948 incorporated an extensive list
of personal rights

and vested major power in the
15
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legislature in reaction to the long history of executive
dominance under traditional dynastic rule and^ Japanese
colonialism.

However, many of its provisions remained

alien to a majority of the Korean people.

The political

structures were not found on the existing political
realities of South Korea; in fact, there existed a huge
gap between the ideological aspirations and the realistic
capabilities of the new political system.

Such

incongruity and disparity were to cause tension and
disturbances rather than harmony and stability (Kim, 1981s
226; Oh, 1968s 191-92).
In August 19^8, the first nationally elected
Constituent Assembly gave birth to the First Republic of
Korea, and elected Syngman Rhee as its first President.
President Rhee was educated in the United States and a
life-time nationalist against Japanese colonialism.
was to be a democratic President.

He

However, from the

beginning, an unchallengeable position of one-man
leadership triumphed over democratic constitutionalism in
the Rhee regime.

Many causes could be attributed to this

development (Oh, 1968: 191-192).
First of all, there was an accute shortage of trained
manpower in every field, particularly in the governmental
bureaucracy and political organizations.

During the

Japanese colonial rule over Korea which lasted 35 years,
the Korean people had only a limited opportunity to serve
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in the colonial administration.

In fact, 95 percent of

the higher civil service positions were filled with the
Japanese.

Even among the clerical posts, two-thirds of

the senior clerkships were exclusively reserved for the
Japanese.

Thus the Koreans who had any experience in

government during this period were largely lower level
clerks (Cho, 1976: 84).
The Korean people also had a limited political
experience.

Political parties in Korea were only post-

World War II developments.

They emerged outside of the

anti-colonial independence organizations, partially due
to the weak nationalist movements staged abroad by exile
groups and to the refusal of the American occupation
authorities to recognize the legitimacy of the anti- ^
Japanese Korean Provisional Government.

Many parties

were also either factions or groups of factions.

Many

of them were built around a leader or group of leaders,
and they disappeared with them.

Factional maneuvers

hampered leadership cohesion and frustrated any effective
recruitment of competent elites (Chai, 1972: 26-27)•
Another cause was the fratricidal Korean War between
South and North Korea.

The war was devastating.

whole country became dislocated.

The

Internal stability and

militant anti-Communism became twin watchwords in South
Korea and the democratic features of the original
Constitution was put aside.

Furthermore, the political
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pendulum swang from a representative system to an
executive-dominant system and Rhee's autocracy became
firmly established.

As a result, the assemblymen yielded

to Rhee in the legislature.

The Liberal party, which was

formed by Rhee in 1951* served faithfully as Rhee's
personal political tool.

The bureaucracy also pledged

its allegiance to Rhee and assisted him as the ways and
means of its own self-preservation.

Corruption and

bribery flourished in the government (Kim, 1976s ^2; Oh,
1968: 192-9^; Wright (Ed.), 1975* 11).
In April i960, the seemingly invincible Rhee regime
collapsed in the hands of students who protested the
massive and blatant riggings of the Presidential election
in the preceding month.

The demise of Rhee brought about

a basic alteration in political system and style.

In

reaction to the Rhee regime, a new Constitution which was
promulgated on June 15, i960 provided legislative
supremacy in the place of executive supremacy.

The

strong presidential system was supplanted by a collective
ly responsible cabinet system, and administrative powers
were vested in a prime minister responsible to the
National Assembly.

In other words, the political pendulum

swang again from an executive-dominant system to a
representative-dominant model.

Following the new

Constitution, on August 23» I960, a cabinet system of
government was created in the Second Republic under the
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premiership of Chang Myun.

At a glance, it seemed that

South Korea was on its way to experiencing a truely
representative' democracy.

However, excesses of the

parliamentary system and intra-party squabbles led to
crippling political immobilism.

Furthermore, continuing

unrest and various demonstrations did not allow the Chang
regime to pursue strong policies for coping with the
pressing multiple problems arising from the overthrow of
the First Republic.

This Second Republic was overthrown

by a military revolution on May 16, 1961, only nine months
after its inception (Kim, 1976: ^3)»
During the military junta period (1961-63), the
military leaders, led by General Park Chung Hee, re
established political authority and were able to stabilize
the chaotic political situation.

In the meantime, they

also adopted a new Constitution and General Park Chung Hee
himself became President of the Third Republic.
Under the new Constitution, the Third Republic became
a highly centralized administration state.

The political

pendulum swang again from a representative-dominant model
to an executive-controlled system.

Under Park's leader

ship, the Assembly was controlled by the Democratic
Republican Party, which was organized as Park's new
political vehicle.

Also, the Park regime introduced a new

administrative reform plan and modern techniques of public
management to enhance governmental efficiency.

Thus, with
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enhance governmental efficiency.

Thus, with a

subservient party, a captive parliamentary majority, and
the effective operation and dynamism of governmental
agencies, the Park regime had established political
stability.

The Park regime was further strengthened

following the October 1972 Revitalizing Reform, which
resulted in the creation of the Fourth "Republic. Under
the October Revitalizing Reform, the political structure
became a paragon of executive predominance, and policy
making and executing functions were completely centralized
in the hands of the President (Kim, 1974-: 134--35; Kim,
1976i 44-45).
Park's authoritarian regime was terminated by his
assassination on October 26, 1979*
created a political vacuum.

His assassination

The democratic euphoria

created by Park's assassination was short-lived however.
There followed another authoritarian military rule, led
by General Chun Doo Hwan.

General Chun himself became

President of the Fifth Republic, following a new
Constitution on October 22, 1980.

Under the new Constitu

tion, the Fifth Republic has remained a highly centralized
administrative state (Lee, 198I: 125-43; Shim, 1980s 22).
Economic Development
A recent World Bank report describes the phenomenal
development of the South Korean economy in these words:

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"From a position uncomfortably close to the bottom of the
international income scale and without the benefit of
significant natural resources, South Korea embarked on a
course of industrial growth that became one of the
outstanding success stories in international development"
(Korean Overseas Information Service, 1979* ^63).

Behind

this success story, the role of dynamic political leader
ship has been considered an essential determinant.
During 19^5-53* the political events severely limited
the potential of the South Korean economy.

The departure

of Japanese management and technical know-how created a
shortage of trained manpower; North Korea's refusal to
supply electricity to South Korea made it necessary for
South Korea to develop its own power sources nearly from
scratch; traditional trade with North Korea and Japan was
ruptured.

To make matters worse, almost all extant

industrial facilities and urban centers were either
destroyed or heavily damaged during the Korean War.
estimated total damage reached $3 billion.

The

The production

capacity of principal manufacturing industries in 1951 was
only 15 percent of the pre-Korean War period in production;
20 percent in machinery; 35 percent in chemicals; and 35
percent in textiles.
inflation;

The war also brought about hyper

price increased 18 times between 1950 and 1953

(Chung, 1980s 277* Korean Overseas Information Service,
1976s 6).
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After the end of the Korean War in mid-1953» the Rhee
regime concentrated its efforts on the rehabilitation of
the war-devastated country.

The efforts were carried out

with foreign aid, mainly U.S. assistance.

As a result,

during 195^-57> industrial facilities were restored to the
pre-war level.

Industrial production rose by an average

of 20 percent a year, and economic growth marked an average
of 5.5 percent.

In 1957» the nation achieved 7*2 percent

economic growth.

This period was characterized by

moderate growth.

However, the country suffered from an

alarming rate of inflation, averaging ^0 percent per annum.
The inflation pressure proved a further deterrent to
domestic savings, and encouraged consumption, speculation,
and more bank borrowing.

The easy credit and overvalued

currency brought about misdirection of investment.

Many

of the new plants were catered for inflated domestic
demand.

The development achieved during this period

relied heavily on foreign aid rather than on a selfsupporting economy (Korea

Annual, 1980: 108; Kim, 1976:

117t Lee, 1969: ^8-^9).
Alarmed by this trend, the Rhee regime introduced a
stabilized program in 1958.

Taxes were raised, capital

spending cut back, the budget deficit eliminated, bank
credit tightened, and the foreign exchange rate was
stabilized at 500 won to one dollar.

As a result, prices

were stabilized for the first time since the war, and the
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rate of inflation was reduced to an annual average of 10.^
percent.

But the pace of economic development slowed down

and unemployment mounted.

To remedy the economic

stagnation, the Rhee regime established ah Economic •
Development Council within the Ministry of Reconstruction
to draw up an overall development plan.

A "Three-year

Economic Development Plan" was adopted by the Council.
These efforts were too late and too little.
unrest mounted.

Political

The Rhee regime was finally overthrown by

the April i960 student revolution, and no "Three-year Plan”
was implemented during the Rhee administration (Lee, 1969s
37-38| Chung, 1981s 277).
As soon as it took power, the Chang regime of the
Second Republic directed the Economic Development Council
to prepare a new "Five-year Economic Development Plan" and
invited a Rand Corporation expert to advise in its
formulation.

At the same time, the Chang regime organized

public hearings for administrative reform, public finance
sind banking, industrial structure, public enterprises,
international balance of payments, employment and standard
of living, and regional development.

The Chang regime

also established a Committee on Government Organizational
Reform, one of whose tasks was to devise a new administra
tive structure to efficiently execute economic development
plans (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 46-^7),
However, as stated earlier, the Second Republic
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proved powerless against the multiple problems arising
from the overthrow of the First Republic.

Crippling

inflation beset the already hard pressed families who had
fixed incomes - particularly the public officials - and
industrial production showed a continuous decline.

During

the one year period under Premier Chang, the price of rice
went up 60 percent, and other items such as coal and oil
jumped more than 23 percent, while production dipped more
than 12 percent.

In less than a year since its establish

ment, the Chang regime was overthrown by the military
revolution of May 1961.

Thus, like its predecessor, the

Chang regime's "Five-year Economic Development Plan" was
never implemented.

The next attempt at planned economic

development was made by the military regime (Kim, 1976s
117).
Since its assumption of power in 1961, the Park
regime energetically carried out a bold institutional
reform and industrialization program with rapid development
of the country's self-sustaining economy.

Structurally, a

major institutional innovation was introduced in June 1961,
when the Park regime organized ail Economic Planning Board
(EPB).

EPB took over planning responsibility from the

Ministry of Reconstruction, and the head of EPB was given
the title of Duputy Prime Minister.

This elevated

position for the chief of the national planning agency
signified the seriousness of the Park regime's planning
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effort.

The agency was also to coordinate and control

conflicts among the various economic ministries.

In

addition, various special committees were established,
including the Central Economic Committee, the Economic
Minister's Meeting, the Economic Vice-minister's Meeting,
the Meeting for Annual Plans and its sub-groups among
related ministries (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 48-4-9).
These various institutional reforms were accompanied
by a series of Five-year Economic Development Plans and
the Park regime was successful in completing the First
(1962-66), the Second (1967-71), and the Third (1972-76)
Plans.

The Fourth Plan was carried out in 1977-81.

The First Plan was to build j.ndustrial foundation.
An average annual growth rate of 7.1 percent was projected
in the plan.

To accomplish these objectives, the Park

regime adopted a set of basic principles:

open-door

economic system; self-reliant base consolidation;
manufacturing and export oriented industrialization; and
social overhead capital expansion.

The Park regime saw

a short cut to the goal of industrialization in the
expansion of social overhead capital, the exploitation
of energy resources and other key industries, and the
fostering of the export and import-substitute industries
and set out to create factors conductive to an independent
growth of the economy.

During the first plan period, an

average annual growth rate was 8.3 percent.

The primary
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industry grew by 5*3 percent annually on the average
during the period, the secondary industry by 15 percent,
and the tertiary industry by 8.9 percent.

The overall

progress was attributable to 1) a determined will to
develop the national economy, in which the government and
the people were firmly united; 2 ) concentrated government
support for problem industries; 3) overcoming of natural
hazards in the agricultural sector, resulting in increased
farm productivity; and

a series of government policies

such as readjustment of the monetary interest rates to
actual market rates, liberalization of trade, and adoption
of a floating exchange rate system, which sought to give
flexibility to the economy (Korean Overseas Information
Service, 1976: 68-7^; Korea Annual, 1980s 109).
The Second Plan (1967-71) was an extension of the
First Plan.

Its overall objective was to lay a foundation

for achieving self-sustaining economy in the early 1980,
by balancing international payments, financing investments
domestically, and achieving full employment.

The prime

objective was to modernize the industrial structure.
Adherence to the principles of market economy was
advocated in the plan to infuse vigor into the national
economy.

The high annual growth rate of 11.4- percent in

this period stemmed from growth in the manufacturing
sector and social overhead capital, as well as an
expansion of exports.

The mining-manufacturing industry
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grew by 21.1 percent.
percent.

Commodity exports grew by 35.2

In the social overhead capital sector, the

expressway linking Seoul and Busan, Daejeon and Gwangju,
and Seoul and Gangreung were partially completed.

This

made one-day nationwide transport a reality (Korean
Overseas Information Service, 1976: 7^-80; Korea Annual,

1980: 109-111).
The principal objective of the Third Plan (1972-76)
was to establish harmony between growth and stability,
combatting the problems carried over from the 1960s.

If

the accomplishments of the first two plans may be summed
up as the laying of a sound basis for economic growth,
the function of the Third Plan was the realization of a
mature national economy.

High priority was given to

intensive development of the rural economy, export
promotion, and the fostering of heavy and chemical
industries.

During the plan period, despite the strains

and difficulties imposed by unfavorable developments in
the world economy, particularly the oil crisis of 1973*
the South Korean economy attained an average annual growth
rate of 11.2 percent, exceeding the target of 8.6 percent
(Korean Overseas Information Service, 1976: 80-93; Korea
Annual, 1980: 111-12).
The Fourth Plan (1977-81) called, for the first time,
for improvements in social welfare.

It was to improve the

standard of living in terms of both quantity and quality.
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With the development ideals of growth, equity, and
efficiency, the basic objectives of this plan were:

1)

to establish a self-supporting growth structure; 2) to
concentrate on social development; and 3) "to effect
significant improvement of technology and the level of
efficiency in the economy, competing internationally in
heavy and chemical industries.

The average annual growth

rate of GNP per capita in 1970-79 was 10.6 percent.

In

1979» South Korea achieved a per capita GNP of $1,62^
together with an export total of $15.1 billion.
remarkable record of growth.

It is a

Per capita income had by

1979 increased 7 times since 1970, and some 20 times since
I960, while exports had grown 1? times since 1970, which
was a prodigious *1-60 times more than the i960 level (Korean
Overseas Information Service, 1976*. 98-99; Kim, 1980: 32).
Social Development
The Liberation brought about a dominant ideology the ideology of equal opportunity.

This potent ideology

gave birth to two important policies of land reform and
educational expansion (Lee, 1968: 67).
In June 19^9* the Rhee regime promulgated a land
reform program to redistribute some 23 percent of the
total arable land in South Korea.

Although this program

had scarcely been started when the Korean War broke out
in June 1950, the Rhee regime was able to carry out a
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fairly effective land reform program and brought about
great changes in the structure of rural society.

The

reform created independent farmers and undermined the
consanguineous bond of the Yangban (the core of the pre
m o d e m force) who lost its economic basis.

Subsequently,

however, the "Land Reform Law" became ineffective because
of the resale of land despite the law prohibiting it.
The pressure of rural population and political unrest
worsened the situation during the Chang period.

Some 4-0

percent of rural families were still reported to own less
than a half hectare of land, when a half hectare was
considered the minimum support to a family.

The Park

.. regime was effective in remedying this situation through
its development efforts.

For instance, a wide spread land

development program added 25 percent more arable land to
the country by 1971*

Development in industry and in

agricultural processing and fishery helped absorb rural
workers wholly or part time into new occupation.

These

efforts have been further strengthened by the "New
Community Movement" since 1971# which has raised rural
income, improved standard of living conditions, and
modernized the work attitudes of the rural people (Lee,
1968: 7^-75? Koh, 1963s 66-70; Lyman, 1975: 251).
Development.in education was truly, of•revolutionary,
proportions in the post-Liberation period.

When the

Compulsory Education System at the primary level was
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initiated by the Rhee regime, education in South Korea
began to change.

An American education model was adapted

to the existing Japanese-traditional system.

The conse

quent encouragement of mass education was eagerly accepted
by the people who had been denied much education during
the Japanese colonial occupation (1910-^5)•

However, the

Rhee regime was unable to give strong financial support to
public education.

About 15 percent of the total opera

tional expenses for public elementary education was borne
by the national government, another 10 percent by the
local government, and the remaining 75 percent by the
parent-teacher associations.

This system of financing

public primary education continue/! during.the Chang regime.
However, this system has been changed since 1961.

The

Park regime established the policy of a completely free
elementary education.

The practice of collecting fees

from the students under various pretexts was outlawed, and
the parent-teacher associations were abolished.

The Park

regime also made progress in coping with other long
standing problems of education.

To deal with the problem

of poor quality and the perennial shortage of teachers,
the system of teacher training replaced the high-school
level institute with the status of two-year teachers'
colleges, which were all state-operated, and their numbers
were increased.

As a result, there were 6,^50 elementary

schools and 831 branches with 117.290 teachers across the
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nation in 1979.

The attendance rate of the school-age

population in 1979 stood at 98.2 percent (Lee, 1970* 221;
Korea Annual, 1980* *1-26-27) •
These two policies - land reform and education - were
the cornerstones in the ensuing process of leveling the
traditional social structure, increasing social mobility,
and ushering in the twin processes of urbanization and
literacy.

They also provided the base for economic

development.

In fact, social development and economic

development progress simultaneously.
If economic development were indicated by such
criteria as increases in production, in per capita national
Income, and in consumption measured as per capita use of
electric energy, social development could be indicated by
such criteria as improvements in the fields of education,
health, nutrition, housing, and social security.

South

Korea has achieved a wide-ranging social development along
the above indicators of development.

For instance,

expanded work opportunity reduced unemployment from *1.5
percent in 1970 to 2.7 percent in 1979.

Life expectancy

increased from 65 in 1970 to 68 years of age in 19751
resulting from improved medical services and the expansion
of medical care insurance system, while the population
growth rate dropped to annual 1.7 percent by 1975.

The

urbanization rate grew from *1-2 .*1- percent in 1966 to 58.2
percent in 1975, and it is expected to reach 67 percent
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in 1981 (Horowitz 1 1966s 195-96; Kim, 1981s 2^8-^9)»
The rapid spread of modernization tends to create
negative social problems and social welfare becomes one of
the most important problems in the process of social
development.

Under the First and the Second republics,

the objective of social welfare was focused on the relief
of immediate social ills, including relief to flood and
fire victims, distribution of free grain during bad crop
years, placement of orphans in institutions or adoptive
homes, aid to disabled veterans, and programs for family,
planning.

These programs met only a limited success.

However, since 1961, following the successful economic
development plans, the Park regime has performed the
institutional development of social welfare remarkably and
legislated several important measures, including the
Livelihood Protection Law (1961), the Calamity Protection
Law (1962), the Child Welfare Law (1961), the Prohibition
from the Fallen Deed Law (1961), the Military Relief
Compansation Law (1961), the Industrial Accidents
Insurance Law (1963), the Medical Insurance Law (1963),
and the National Welfare Pension Law (1973)*

On the basis

of these laws, the Park regime has expanded social welfare
programs.

Some of the important welfare programs are:

1) facilities relief; 2 ) housing relief; 3) poverty
relief; 4-) calamity relief; 5) self-support guidance; 6 )
children's welfare; 7 ) women's welfare; and 8) social
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security.

The budget in social welfare sector has also

grown about 6 times, from 110,88? million won in 1970 to
691*872 million won in 1977.

Furthermore, the Fourth

Five-year Economic Development Plan (1977-81) called for
improvements in social welfare as one of its basic
objectives.
follows:

The targets of this objectives were as

1) minimize unemployment by expanding employment

opportunities? 2 ) improve quality of education and develop
an education system which will be consistent with the
expected demand for manpower; 3) solve national housing
problems by promoting housing construction; *0 establish
an overall public health program and develop a low-cost
health delivery system; 5 ) encourage an increase in the
proportion of publicly-held firms and enhance the social
responsibility of business; 6) gradually adopt a minimum
wage policy and improve working conditions; 7) strengthen
cooperation between employer and employee; 8) reduce
population growth rate and prevent the concentration of
population and industry in urban areas; 9 ) provide for
environmental conservation and minimize pollution ; and
10) expand and improve the social security system and
promote wealth accumulation of the middle income class
(Koh, 1975* 51-52; Korean Overseas Information Service,
19761 99-100).
In sum, since independence in 19^8, South Korea has
not seen a peaceful transfer of power, but experienced
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some important changes.

The First and the Second

republics introduced m o d e m political institutions.
Particularly, since 1961, South Korea's political system
has rapidly gained in stability under the highly
centralized government and its political stability has
significantly contributed to modernistic national
development.

Kundaehwa (modernization) has become a

full-fledged political symbol and the focus of national
development has become economic development.

However,

economic development in the South Korean context implies
far more than the usual complex of economic indicators.
It connotes the expansion of societal infrastructure, the
greater sense of national purpose, and the groundswell of
rising popular expectations created by more than a decade
of booming prosperity.

In this development, the role of

dynamic political leadership and capable task elites has
been considered essential if a backward nation is to leap
into a period of economic expansion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER III
POLITICAL LEADERSs THEIR VALUES AND
DEVELOPMENTAL ORIENTATIONS
Values and attitudes axe the internalized standards
of an individual which give order and direction to his
thoughts and behavior, and political leaders' values and
attitudes are important in determing their major courses
of political action

(Whang, 1970s 24-25).

Differences in

the values and attitudes of political leaders in South
Korea are an important indicator for understanding their
political courses of action for national development.
As a transitional society, South Korea has been
confronted with many changes such as demographic, socio
cultural, ideological, technological, economic, and
political.

These changes, furthermore, include a great

variety of characteristics.
speed, weight, and length

They differ in terms of
of time.

The various attitudes

toward such changes by political leaders in South Korea
are reflected in their different values and attitudes.
According to Hahn-been Lee (1968: 6-9), there are
three basic attitudes toward changes
and ambivalent.

positive, negative,

These different attitudes influence and

modify the tendencies arising from the different time
perspectives of past, present, and future.

A combination

35
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of time perspective and attitude toward change produces a
general guideline of action.

Lee called it "time

orientation" and divided it into three types:

escapist,

exploitationist, and developmentalist.
According to Lee, escapists have a negative attitude
toward change.

They distrust time and the future.

In a

process of relentless change, time becomes a burdensome
pressure, and the past is being grounded to pieces and
senselessly used up as raw material in the fabrication of
an unthinkable future.
the outcome is escapism.
under pressure.

Prom a perspective of the past,
This is a stance of weakness

It tends to be a negative, backward-

looking orientation toward change.

Exploitationists have

an ambivalent attitude toward change between the positive
and the negative.

Under the pressure and tension of

change, their time perspective is neither looking backward
nor seeing the future as meaningful.

Their ambivalent

attitude is owing to weakness of inner identity coupled
with a lack of clear and consistent purpose for the
future.

From a perspective of the present, they try to

maximize short-run returns through manipulation of the
existing circumstances.

Developmental!sts have a positive

attitude toward change.

They trust time and the future.

To them, time opens up a wonderful opportunity to increase
the scope of knowledge and to search for the unknown
future.

Prom a perspective of the future, it is linked to
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the idea of development, because development requires a
conception of time in terms of a long-range, upward line
or spiral.

This is a belief that time is a helpful

instrument available to man in his struggle for a better
future.
In this regard, it may be hypothesized that the
values and attitudes of President Park Chung Hee were of
more developmentalist orientation than those of President
Syngman Rhee and Premier Chang Myun.

The following

section is a brief comparison of their different develop
mental values and attitudes.

More specifically their

orientations in the following areas will be compared:

1)

achievement orientation; 2 ) change orientation; 3) future
orientation; and 4-) overseas orientation.
Achievement Orientation
Achievement orientation means in part one's
commitment to growth, especially economic growth.

When

the achievement orientation is directed toward economic
purposes, it could help bring about rapid economic
development to the society.
President Rhee was prominent in the anti-Japanese
movement in the first decade of this century, served time
in jail, spent 33 years in exile in the United States as
the foremost Korean nationalist, returned to Korea in 19^5
in the political chaos of liberation and became the leader
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of anti-Communist political forces.

In 19^8, he was

elected First President of the Republic of Korea (ROK)
and led the country through the devastation of the Korean
War and its aftermath.

Success in this environment

required charisma and expertise at political intrigue
rather than administrative and managerial talent (Jones
and Sakong, 1980: 4-0-4-2).
President Rhee was a prolific speaker and enjoyed
impromptu addresses.

His favorite method of reaching the

people was through public speeches, which were reported in
full in the local newspapers.

Using invaluable symbols of

Korea's fight against both the Japanese and the
Communists, President Rhee exploited his image as "father
of his country" and repeatedly stated that national unity
of South Korea and unification of South and North Korea
were his ultimate goals.

His ambition to become President

of a united Korean republic was a logical outgrowth for
his essentially messianic outlook (Oliver, I960: 278-279*
329i Koh, 1963s 1; Allen, i960: 237).
Duting and after the Korean War, however, President
Rhee realized that his goals were realistically beyond his
reach.

But this avowed pursuit of national unity and

unification of South and North Korea produced several
results.

On the one hand, he had won his long fight to

get the needed material aid from the United States for
building a substantial ROK defense force and economic
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reconstruction.

On the other hand, his goals concealed

the difficulties in domestic economy, and prevented his
political opponents from challenging his presidency
(Oliver, 1978: 433; Koh, 1963: 1).
President Rhee thus devoted much energy to political
action rather than administrative and economic development.
From his experience of infighting among exile factions in
Hawaii, he was exposed to the techniques of survival among
political groups whose weapons were conspiracy and
assassination.

When he returned to Korea, he took a

"blackjack” along.

One of his strong weapons was a

political machine which advanced his own policies.

During

the Rhee administration, National Assembly was often
intimidated by arrests and the declaration of martial law.
Although President Rhee did not have administrative
‘ experience prior to becoming President of South Korea,
he did indeed have great confidence in his own ability and
decided himself all administrative matters.

He had

neither the time nor the energy to make all the necessary
decision, yet he would not delegate authority to others.
An appalling amount of his time was spent on trivia,
including the signing of documents and the greeting of
visitors.

The cabinet met at varying intervals, but it

was prone to go for long periods without meeting at all.
It was characteristic of the Rhee administration that the
cabinet had little function in policy-making; it merely
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listened to President Rhee expound it.
policy-making mechanism.

South Korea had no

This paralysis of the decision

making process was further aggravated "by President Rhee's
penchant for cabinet reshuffles (Allen, 1960 s 219-236;
Koh, 19631 55-56; Chung, 19621 16-17).
President Rhee knew littie of economics, but could
not be shaken of his conviction.
with economic growth.

His concerns were not

Economic development was viewed as

a part of economic recovery and an extension of economic
stabilization, and economic planning was considered as a
basic tool of Communists.

He believed that American aid

could help revive South Korea's blasted and divided
economy.

He told the people, "American technicians are

helping us to organize the coal mining and electricity
generating programs upon which our hope of industrialism
is based.

American fertilizers are providing the basis

for the best crop year in our history."

However, the

U.S. aid program was directed more to importation of
consumer goods than to the building up of basic production
facilities, and aggravated South Korea's tendency to
consumption, rather than production, and fostered a
consumption-first economy.

This ran diametrically counter

to the direction the South Korean economy should have
taken for the attainment of self-sufficiency (Allen, I960:
238-239; Oliver, I96O 1 278-280; Chung, 1962: 124; Whang,
1970 s 32-36; Oliver, 1978s 481-482).
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Following the demise of the Rhee regime, Chang Myun,
the Premier of the Second Republic, made conscious efforts
to respond to the mounting problems in the country.
However, he had neither the charisma of President Rhee nor
any solid basis of political power.
United States.

He studied in the

Following his return to Korea in 1925* he

devoted himself to education in Korea within the Catholic
Church, first in Pyongyang and later in Seoul.

For 17

years, until the end of the Second World War, he served as
superintendent of

a

Catholic Commercial school in Seoul

(Hahn, 1975* 305; Han,

197^* 115).

Premier Chang had had little experience or contact
with political activities when he turned to political life
in 19^6.

He showed a considerable degree of timidity and

indecisiveness in situations which required strong
determination and immediate action.

He often disappeared

in the critical situation and took no action.

For

instance, when South Korea was experiencing the political
crisis of 1952, which involved intimidation of the
National Assemblymen by the military and national police,
he was scheduled to read a declaration against President
Rhee's scheme for a constitutional ammendment at a meeting
of anti-Rhee politicians.

He disappeared, however, from

the political scene and stayed in a U.S. military hospital
located in South Korea.

His five-day disappearance

following the military Revolution of 1961 was another
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example (Han,.

197*H 116-117).

As a matter of fact, Premier Chang's Democratic Party
regime did not come to power through its own efforts.
Premier Chang's political rise was also due to the
conflict between the "old" and the "new" factions in the
Democratic Party.

He was a compromise choice, and his

power base was uncertain.

To form a parliamentary

majority, for instance, he attempted to organize a
coalition cabinet consisting of "old" and "new" faction
members as well as of independents.

However, the

independents could not be brought into stable coalition
with his party because of their heterogeneity in member
ship and wide variety in political ambitions and views.
At the same time, the "old" faction became hostile to the
"new" faction and finally formed a separate party called
the "New Democratic Party."

Furthermore, he could not

readily count on the support of his own faction because of
their rebellious and demanding attitudes.

In spite of his

compromising efforts, he eventually failed to deal with
such cleavages effectively, and consequently lost much of
the support and loyalty for his regime (Hah,

197^** 136-

137, 176-177; Chung, 1962s 82-83} Lee, 1968: 138).
Premier Chang's Democratic Party, which took over
power in the wake of Student Revolution in I960, was not
prepared to take charge of government.

In their desperate

struggle against the Rhee regime, they neither experienced

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

any exercise of power, nor developed any administrative
decision-making.

The government was weak and inefficient

(Lee, 1968s 135).
The Chang regime was, furthermore, not capable of
normalizing social order or of controlling the street
demonstrations.

It was unable to combat the hitherto

unheard of anti-American, neutralist, and openly proCommunist policies advocated by radical politicians and
newspapers.
shambles:

Meanwhile, national economy was in a
millions of unemployed were without relief, the

farmers were desperate, and, in the cities, organized
gangsters and hoodlums made life miserable and unsafe for
small businessmen and citizens.

Actual starvation

occurred in some parts of the country and the term "spring
hunger" in Korea was even more applicable than usual.
Even though Premier Chang formulated some action programs
and economic development plan, his personal weakness and
the party politicians' preoccupation with internal
squables relegated those programs to a mere prototype
(Chung, 1962s 85-86, 125-126} Kil, 1972s lW-1^5).
In constrast to President Rhee and Premier Chang,
President Park showed more commitment to the nation's
economic development.

He emphasized that "without a hope

for an economic future, reforms in other fields such as
politics, social affairs, and culture could not be
expected to yield fruit," or "without economic
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reconstruction, there would be no such things as triumph
over Communism or attaining independence."

He believed

that creation of a self-supporting economy through planned
economic development was a key to national development as
well as a precondition for unification.
to growth was manifested in two aspects:

His commitment
the first was

the share of his time devoted to economic matters; the
second was the degree of support given to achievementoriented bureaucrats, technocrats, and entrepreneurs (Park
1970: 171-175; Jones and Sakong, 1980: ^3. 291-292).
According to one study, President Park's average
daily schedule included receiving 14- callers to his Blue
House office, presiding over at least one meeting, and
traveling 120 kilometers.

President Park often presided

over the government conferences, participated in the
public ceremonies and gatherings, and conducted on-thespot checking.

On the briefing room in his office, he

posted up a great variety of maps and charts to enable
him to oversee the whole developmental efforts.

Even when

he pushed a workload through the day and on up to midnight
according to one report, he took to his bedside pen and
paper for last-minute thoughts or further information
(Kil, 1972: 20-21, 79).
As a military man', President Park also knew how to
use the staff organization.

He increasingly relied on the

governmental bureaucracy, whereas President Rhee and
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Premier Chang used political parties, youth groups, and
cronies to achieve their goals.

President Park mobilized

the entire executive branch to make decisions based on
expected economic outcomes.

During the Park administra

tion, the symbols of "national development" and "economic
development" predominated government policies and actions.
The Park administration is credited with the adoption of
economic development plans, institution of comprehensive
planning and control system, and revamping of many
sluggish government corporations (Jones and Sakong, 1980:
4-7-49; Lee, 1968: 173).
Change Orientation
Traditionally, Korean society.has been under the
strong influence of Confucianism, which advocated the
status quo.

Social change in traditional Korea was

accepted only on an incremental basis.

Even today, it is

very likely that older persons would be more Confucianoriented and more conservative than younger persons.
President Park's background which is different from
President Rhee or Premier Chang is instructive in this
' connection.

When Rhee became President of South Korea in

1948, his age was 70.

Chang's age was 6l in i960.

were born in the 19th century.

Both

On the other hand, Park

was 44 years old when he became a leader of military coup
in 1961 (Choi, 1974: 20; Oh, 1968: 128; Han, 1974: 115).
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Since South Korea was liberated from Japanese rule,
considerable change has taken place in the society.
Especially in the 1950s, profound

changes took place in

the educational field and the military subsociety.
However, President Rhee remained old and traditional.
President Rhee's age tells much about him.
As a young man, President Rhee was educated in a
Protestant missionary school, and joined in the Independent
Club Movement which was one of the major indigenous moves
toward modernization in Korea at the end of the last
century.

By the age of twenty, he became a street c o m e r

agitator for modernization and democratic reforms of
the decadent monarchy.

His mind was bursting with ideas

for the improvement of the state and cutting his tradi
tional topknot was to demonstrate his commitment toward
reform.

After the Japanese annexation of Korea, his

book, The Spirit of Independence, became the bible of
the Korean independence movement.

However, more than

half a century elapsed between his reformist days and his
assumption of actual political leadership in the post-war
years.

When he became President in Sough Korea's first

republic, President Rhee was already an old man.

The

passage of time had eroded his youthful zeal for reform.
Furthermore, his egotism and the inflexibility which
characterized his old age and preconceptions made it
impossible for him to accept criticism, or to change his
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mind once he had made it up (Cole and Lyman, 1971* 26-27?
Oliver, i960* 28; Oliver, 1978*

Lee, 1968* 79-80).

President Rhee was jealous of associates.
regarded them as his political rivals.

He

He was self-

confident of his ability to lead a newly independent
republic.

He drove most self-respecting officials out of

the government and insisted on "yes-men" around him.

As

a result, he was surrounded by a screen of secretaries,
guards, and his Liberal Party politicians and gradually
isolated himself from the people.

The Liberal politicians

utilized President Rhee's lack of information for their
own purposes.
widespread.

Their power was abused and corruption was
In the end, President Rhee was forced out of

power by the i960 Student Revolution.

Because of mental

and physical infirmities of old age, President Rhee failed
to keep contact with the people and lost his awareness of
their needs and desires.

He failed to build political and

other institutions that could absorb and channel the new
energies and resources in the country for the purpose of
modernization (Allen, i960* 181, 238-239; Chung, 1962*
252-253; Cole and Lyman, 1971* 26-27).
Since the Student Revolution of i960, the Korean
intellectuals became more politically active.

This new

generation began to distinguish itself from the old
generations and demanded for generation change in every
sphere of society.

They were for change and their change
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orientation was expressed in "antagonism against the
flatters of power holders," "the development of a selfsupporting economy," and "rationalization of individual
life."

To meet their demands, Premier Chang purged many

pro-Rhee senior bureaucrats and permitted a great degree
of free expression, publication, and open political
activity,

"Economic Development First" became a symbol

and the bureaucracy was opened widely to post-Liberation
college graduates.

However, the Chang regime was weak

and unstable (Whang, 1970: 20-21; Cole and Lyman, 1971s
31-33).
The Chang regime's weakness was shown in the legisla
tion of special retroactive laws.

The purpose of the laws

was to punish illicit profiteers and anti-democratic lawviolators, but vacillating legislative discussions
postponed the sweeping reform of old evils.

Premier

Chang's attempts to apply old laws instead in the revolu
tionary period met fierce reactions from the intellectuals
and students (Han, 1971: 1^-15).
Following the i960 Student Revolution, the relatively
liberal political atmosphere provided leftist politicians
and other political groups with an opportunity to organize
and advocate their radical views.

Premier Chang

attempted to bring about chimerical reconciliation not
only between the radical and conservative groups, but also
between the anti-Rhee and pro-Rhee forces.

However, his
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attitudes were basically conservative.

He tried to

improve the existing system and keep its underlying
ideological values intact (Han,

19?1« 15-19)•

Premier Chang's Democratic. Party leadership was of
the same age and shared much of the same social and
educational backgrounds as the leadership of the Rhee
regime.

The Liberal and Democratic parties were politi

cally like twins and no real ideological differences
existed between them.

Furthermore, bribery, graft,

nepotism and favoritism were widespread.

Cabinet change

also followed cabinet change and destroyed the continuity
and efficiency in the executive branch of the government
(Lee, 1968s 13^; Park, 1970s 166-171; Chung, 1962s 85-86).
After successful military revolution, General Park
claimed that his revolution was a revolution of national
reform, and its essential purposes were the fundamental
transformation of political climate and the renovation of
social and economic systems.

To accomplish these goals,

he insisted that new forces must be formed and they must
undertake such tasks as construction of maximum constitu
tional reforms, change of generation levels, purification
of society, and improvement of various institutions.

He

also emphasized that the Military Revolution was an
extension of the Student Revolution.

He asserted, "if the

Student Revolution overthrew the Liberal Party on the
surface, the Military Revolution overthrew the Liberal
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Party inside which wore the mask of the Democratic Party
and sought to satiate its appetite,”

At the time of the

April 19 Student Revolution, the motto of students was
"withdrew established generation."

In this regard,

General Park's belief was correlated with the idea of
generation change.

It demanded the transformation of the

elite of the society from one type of individual to
another and from one group of people to another, with
different values and attitudes (Park, 19?0: 22-24, 54-56,
106-107; Whang, 1970: 15-21).
Since the Third Republic of Korea was created with
General Park himself as President, President Park coopted
many intellectuals and other civilians as well as a large
number of retired military officers into his regime.

The

sources of past evils - dogmatism, corruption, irregulari
ty, injustice, and incompetence were attacked and
sincerity, cooperation and emphasis on action were
emphasized.

He insisted on the creation of a new politi

cal climate where there were no grounds for petty heroism
and name-peddling.
cians.

He mobilized professors and politi

He coopted scholars to create a philosophy of

revitalization; intellectuals to highten popular
enthusiasm for reconstruction; and businessmen to strive
within their industries.

He encouraged workers and

peasants to perspire in their works; students to renovate
themselves in austerity; solidiers to be fearless; and
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public officials to dedicate themselves to service.
the meantime,

In

President Park introduced various

institutional changes necessary for effective economic
decision-making (Kim, 1981* 16 j Park, 1970* 171-176;
Chung, 1962 i 127-128).
President Park made a fundamental shift in adminis
trative philosophy.
elements:

The new philosophy consisted of three

1) a strong goal orientation and a high regard

for institution as a means for carrying out the goalsj
2 ) a willingless to replace inappropriate means with
alternative means 1 and 3) a willingless to expand
institution as necessary to achieve the goals.

President

Park's values and attitudes toward national development
served the bases for change (Jones and Sakong, 1980:

47-48).
Future Orientation

As earlier stated, impatient waiting for nearly half
a century had eroded President Rhee's youthful zeal for
building a better, nation and planted in his mind an
escapist time orientation.

His image of Korea was of the

country that had existed before her capitulation to Japan,
and hence he felt that Korea had to be restored to her
former integrity at the first opportunity (Lee, 1968:
79-80).
President Rhee repeatedly stated, "without
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unification, none of other gains could matter very much.'-'
He believed that unification could ultimately solve
domestic problems.

Economic problem was secondary to him.

To President Rhee, economic development was a part of
economic recovery and an extension of economic stabiliza
tion.

He considered economic planning as a basic tool of

Communists.

He preferred liberal Jeffersonianism.

he lacked economic knowledge and programs.

But

Furthermore,

future-oriented public officials were aggravated by Rhee’s
insistance on "yes men" and maintenance of the status quo.
As a result, the Rhee regime's exploitationist orientation
was translated into a short-run control program, which
depended upon foreign economic aid (Oliver, 1978: ^335
Oliver, I960: 271} Allen, I960: 235-239} Lee. 1968: 178).
During the Rhee regime, U.S. grant-type aid

...

totaled $2.7 billion, and some significant future-oriented
programs were attempted.

However, the Rhee regime failed

to develop such basic industries as electricity, coal,
fertilizer, and cement, and such overhead capitals as
transportation and communication.
they lacked a program.

One reason was that

Another was that American aid was

more consumer oriented and the politicians often misused
it for political purposes.

This situation resulted in a

breakdown of a momentum of political and socio-economic
development (Korea statistical yearbook’
,

1959-81} Chung,

1962: 18} Park, 1970: 36-38).
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The fall of the Rhee regime disclosed a chaotic
economic picture.

South Korea was importing about 15

times as much as she exported annually, and the rates of
inflation and unemployment were quite high, averaging
respectively about 10 percent and more than 20 percent
each year.

To halt the rocketing price index and to pro

vide jobs for the unemployed, Premier Chang attempted some
significant future oriented economic development plan and
action programs.

The "National Construction Service (NCS)"

program was announced in December i960 and its detailed
plans was made public in February 1961, and a Five-year
Economic Development Plan starting in 1962 was adopted
early in 1961 (Han, 197*^ 207-209; Lee, 1968: 132-13*0.
As a "New Deal" type of public works program, the
NCS program declared that it would absorb millions of the
unemployed, especially the educated unemployed, into such
projects as irrigation, reforestation, land reclamation,
road building, and dam-building.

A new Rural Development

Authority was to be entrusted with community development
projects, agricultural extension services, and cottage
industries.

The Five-year Economic Development Plan also

called for the intensive development of sources of
electric power to meet additional immediate needs and
anticipated future demands.

Major emphasis was being

placed on the promotion of small industries, especially
those oriented toward export, to help improve South
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Korea's imbalance of trade and alleviate unemployment.
Both programs required a strong leadership and a concerted
national coalition.

However, the inadequacy of Premier

Chang's ability had little chance for these programs to
succeed.

A chronic schism within his Democratic Party

seriously undermined those programs.

In addition, most of

the largest businesses were reluctant to make new invest
ments because of uncertainty and fear concerning the
possibility of punishment for their illegal wealth
accumulated during the Rhee regime.

Private savings in

the major banks decreased considerably, because of the
"sense of economic crisis" felt by many savings account
holders.

As a result, many of the measures adopted by the

Chang regime concerning economic development failed to
enhance the popular confidence and support which the Chang
government hoped to receive (Han, 197^$ 209-211; Chung,
1962: 8k, 9^-95; Lee, 1968s 131-135).
President Park was b o m into an extremely poor
farming family in a tiny village.

From his early life, he

understood that without economic affluence, a freer and
more equitable life was impossible, and believed that
elimination of want and poverty was the first step toward
building a better nation.

He saids "Condition of poverty

awoke me many times and cemented my resolve.
been my guide and my benefactor.

Poverty has

Thus, I cannot part with

this guide and benefactor for even one hour out of the
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twenty-four."

To him, time opened up a wonderful opportu

nity for a better future.

He often declared that "Where

there is a desire, there is a road to be found," or "It is
difficult, even in this age of scientific progress, to
forecast the weather 2k hours ahead, but leader must
maintain an unswerving attitude and fortitude in over
coming any unforeseen obstacles."

His future orientation

undoubtedly contributed to the vigorous adoption of the
Five-year Economic Development Plans and the "Saemaul (New
Community) Movement" in South Korea (Oh, 1968: 135; Park,
1970« 191; Kil, 1972s 1^7-1^9; Chung, 1962: 25k).
As a long-range development program, the chief
objectives of the Five-year Economic Development Plans
were to provide a better living standard and to increase
welfare and subsidy programs.

President Park was

convinced that a self-supporting economy could not be
achieved by foreign aid alone.

During his regime, four

successive five-year economic development plans were
carried out, and economic development and modernization
became the single most important theme of the government.
Vivid changes and developments could be seen everywhere.
The poverty and aimlessness that marked the country at one
time were replaced by a new confidence and determination
to bring about an affluent society (Park, 1979« 67-112).
Following the successive economic development plans,
President Park also introduced the "Saemaul Movement" in
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1971*

He emphasized that the "Saemaul Movement" was the

great new forward movement of the people for the achieve
ment of the country's supreme objectives of "modernization
and unification."
the movement.
better."

He contributed his personal utmost to

The Saemaul Movement stood for "we can live

Its guiding principles were "deligence, self-

help, and cooperation" (Kil, 1970: 159-16*0.
This movement that originally started in the country
side has spread to cities and factories and begun to
involve the whole gamut of South Korea's national life as
a pan-national movement.

Progressing from its initial

goal of creating more affluent villages that are both
thrifty and wealthy, the movement has introduced a life of
decency and culture in the midst of affluence and humanism.
Furthermore, the confidence of "we can live better" has
helped promote national regeneration and the sense of
pride for the generations to come (Korea Annual, 1980:
192-19^5 Park, 1979s 67-112).
Overseas Orientation
As explained earlier, President Rhee's overseas
experience was not self-motivated, but was the result of
Japanese colonialism.

As a boy, President Rhee's first

contact with the West was a dramatic one.

When he was

nine, an epidemic of smallpox left him blind in both eyes.
His parents sought relief in various herb remedies without
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success.

Only as a last resort did they determine to take

the young boy to a foreigner, Dr. Horace Allen, who was
later to become American minister in Seoul.

Dr. Allen's

medicines restored to President Rhee the gift of sight.
President Rhee's experience with Dr. Horace Allen
stimulated his further interest in the West,

At the age

of nineteen, President Rhee attended the Paichai School
which was founded by a Methodist minister, Henry G.
Appenzeller.

There he learned of the Western World and

came to think of the West as the power center of the world.
At that time, he was also involved in the struggle to
maintain Korean independence from Japanese aggression.
When his agitation failed, he was forced to leave the
country.

His choice was to go to America (Allen, i960:

21-25).
During his long exile life in the United States,
President Rhee received reeducation in Western thought
and earned three academic degrees.

He earned an B.A.

degree from George Washington University, an M.A. in
European History from Harvard University, and a Ph. D. in
Political Science at Princeton University.

He eventually

married a European and traveled widely as a roving head
of Korea's provisionary government (Oliver, 1978: 4-5;
Lee, 19681 79-80).
As a political exile, President Rhee pursued two
major goals - to win diplomatic support for the exiled
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government and to build popular understanding and sympathy
for Korea among the American public as well as in other
foreign countries.

However, he was constantly frustrated

by foreign disregard of his efforts and his country's
political claims.
foreign countries.

He developed a negative attitude toward
They were not really friends.

friendly reference was only to the United States.

His
In

other words, his overseas orientation was limited to a
specific country (Oliver, 1978s 4-5).
After the Korean War, President
pacific anti-Communistalliance.
strongly anti-Japanese.

Rhee

He was,

advocated a

however,

He was also completely incapable

of accepting those nations that were indifferent to the
question of Korean unification (Allen, I960: 238).
Within the economic field, President Rhee disliked
any kind of foreign loans and collaboration with foreign
countries.

His economic thought was partially colored by

the fact that Japanese

loan to Korea during the Yi dynasty

was one of the reasons

why Japan was able

to forcethe

Annexation Treaty between Korea and Japan in 1910 (Whang,
1970 s 4-8-49).
Unlike President Rhee, Premier Chang's overseas
experience was self-motivated.

Premier Chang was born to

a reasonably wealthly Catholic family.

After studying

English at the YMCA institute for about three years, he
went to the United States to study education and religion
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at Manhattan College and returned to Korea five years
later.

His Catholic background and knowledge of the

English language were instrumental in his appointment to
South Korea's Interim Assembly in 19^6 by the American
Military Government, and also helped him to serve as the
first South Korean ambassador to the U.N. and later to
the United States (Han, 197^s 115-116).
Premier Chang received much credit for his successful
effort to persuade the U.N. to render official recognition
of the South Korean government in December 19^8.

As a

Catholic, he brought to the government a broad base of
additional support from abroad, and his moderate views and
quiet personality kept him from having enemies.

In

Feburary 1951» he was appointed prime minister by President
Rhee (Han, 197^: 115-116; Oliver, 1978s 206).
Once in power as the political leader of the Second
Republic, Premier Chang's overseas orientation was
especially apparent in the foreign policy area.

Premier

Chang renounced the reckless policy of unification by
force, advocated by the Rhee regime, and stated that he
would strive for free election throughout Korea for
unification within the framework of the United Nations
Charter.

He also declared plans to widen the country's

diplomatic relations, including the establishment of ties
with various Afro-Asian states as well as the Free World.
He indicated that South Korea would seek to achieve
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admission to membership in the U.N., and further to extend
its deplomatic relationship.

While the Rhee regime was

unwilling to make any distinction between the Communist
and the non-aligned countries, a new attitude of Premier
Chang called for readjustment of South Korean foreign
policy toward Japan and friendly neutral nations.
Particularly Premier Chang stressed that diplomatic rela
tions between South Korea and Japan should be made normal
as soon as possible on the principle of mutual respect
and reciprocity (Chung, 1962s 83-8^? Koo, 1975* 216-217).
President Park's educational experiences were very
different from those President Rhee and Premier Chang.
He entered the Japanese Military Academy of Manchukuo in
19^0.

Two years later, he graduated from the Academy at

the head of his class, and was immediately enrolled in
the Regular Course of the Japanese Imperial Military
Academy in Tokyo and graduated at the third of his class
in 1 9 ^ .

His successful performance in competition with

Japanese and other foreigners could undoubtedly have
increased his confidence in his own ability to work abroad
and to succeed.

He also attended the advanced course of

the United States Army Artillery School for special
training (Park, 1970s 238; Whang, 1970s ^8-^9s Chung,
1962s 137-138).
After the Military Revolution in 1961, General Park
declared, "the doors of the nation are boldly opened to
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the world.

Relations with the United States are most

important, hut visits will he made to the neutralist hloc
nations as well, and their delegations are welcomed.”
During the Park regime, his commitment to international
cooperation provided a new turning point in the South
Korean foreign policy.

Diplomatic relations were expanded

and negotiations with Japan were concluded.

In addition,

economic diplomacy was energetically promoted to induce
foreign capital.

Because of South Korea's small-scale

domestic market and lack of natural resources, President
Park believed that a self-supporting economy could not he
achieved hy foreign aid alone.

He strived for attracting

foreign loans and investments as well as promoting export.
To attain multilateral economic cooperation, his
approaches were not limited to the Free World, hut they
embraced the neutral hloc nations and even the Communist
nations (Park, 1970* 69-70, 87-89; Korea Annual, 1980*

81-86).
The above discussions show that President Park was
more achievement-oriented, more change-oriented, more
future-oriented, and more overseas-oriented than either
President Rhee or Premier Chang.

President Park showed

more developmental!st orientation than the civilian
political leaders that South Korea had had.
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CHAPTER IV

TASK ELITES: THEIR SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS AND
RECRUITMENT PATTERNS
One of the hypotheses of this study is that changes in
the political leaders' values and developmental orientations
will hring about corresponding changes in the patterns of
their task elites recruitment particularly between the
civilian regime and the military regime of President Park
and Chun in South Korea.

This chapter will examine these

differences, focusing on the social backgrounds of the
cabinet ministers during the period from 19^8 to 1982.
The data used in this section were initially.collected
by Professors Kim and Lovell.

Their information includes

such items as Year of Birth, Place of Birth (Province,
Urban/Rural), Education, Foreign Travel and Residence,
Occupation, and Party Affiliation.

In the coding plan,

periodization was structured to correspond to the terms of
South Korea's National Assembly.
were Jj-35 cabinet ministers.

During 19^8-1982, there

Of these cabinet ministers,

some enjoyed their positions for several years, while
others did so only for a few months (See Table 1).
Furthermore, some served in different cabinet positions in
the same period.

When this happened, the pattern of

career development is emphasized in the coding plan.

62
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T a b le 1

\

i

The Period of Incumbency in the Cabinet

I

Total
years

Ministries

Average
years

Civilian
years

Military
years

(years)

(years)

Prime Minister

. Aug. 1948
-Jan. '82

1.41

1.07

1.72

Economic
Planning Board

Dec. 1963
-Jan. '82

2.0 7

-

2.07

Foreign Affairs

Aug. 1948
-Sept. '80

1.64

1.47

1.76

Home Affairs

Aug. 1948
-Sept. '80

0.76

0.45

1.29

Aug. 1948
-Jan. '82

1.16

1.07

1.22

Justice

Aug. 1948
-Sept.'80

1.20

1.07

1.29

National
Defense

Aug. 1948
-Dec. '79

1.40

1.18

1.60

Education

Aug. 1948
-May '80

1.28

1.31

1.27

Agriculture
& Fisheries

Aug. 1948
-Oct. '80

0.94

0.65

1.29

Commerce &
Industry

Aug. 1948
-Sept.'80

1.11

0.78

1.49

Energy &
Resources

Dec. 1977
-Jan. '82

1.04

-

1.04

Construction

May 1961
-Jan. '82

1.22

-

1.22

Health &
Social Affairs

Jun. 19^9
-Sept.'80

1.21

0.79

1.76

1.15

1.07

1.21

V,
Finance

Transportation

"

Aug. 1948

-Oct. '80
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Table 1 (Continued)

Ministries

Total
years

Average
years

Civilian
years

Military
years

(years).

(years)

Communications

Aug. 1948
-Oct. '80

1.04

Culture &
Information

Jun. 1961
-May '80

1.58

-

1.58

Government
Administration

Dec. 1963
-Oct. '79

3.98

-

3.98

National Unifi
cation Board

Feb. 1969
-Jan. '82

1.44

-

1.44

Science &
Technology

Apr. 1967
-Sept. '80

3.38

-

3.38

Without
Portfolio

Aug. 1948
-May '6l;
Mar. 1963
-Nov. '80

0.98

1.68

0.77

x=l .5 0

x=1.04

X=1 .6 3

0.90

1.14

Source. Korea Annual, 1980, pp. 438-443.
Note. The cases of the incumbent ministers are not
included in the computation.

The following section compares the various social
background variables of South Korean cabinet ministers
such as Year of Birth, Urban and Rural Place of Birth,
Place of Birth by.Province, Level of Education, Place of
College or University Education, and Prior Occupation.
also compares their differences between the two regimes
and concludes with the findings of different patterns of
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It

65
task elites recruitment by political leaders.

Social Backgrounds of the Cabinet Ministers

Age
Table 2
Year of Birth
.
_____ ;
___________
Civilian Regime

(percent)

Military Regime

Year
Rhee

Chang

Total

Park

Chun

Total

before 1900
/
1901-1910

>56.3

30.4

47.8

12.9

0.0

10.6

22.9

30.4

25.4

21.6

0.0

17.9

1911-1920

20.8

34.8

25.4

28.7

8.3

25.1

1921-1930

0.0

4.4

1.4

33.3

58.4

37.7

1931-1940

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.5

33.3

8.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

(48)

(23)

(71)

(171)

(36)

(207)

Total
1 I)
(Base)
Note.

V,

The cases of "no information" are not included in

the computation.

Table 2 shows that cabinet ministers of the military
regime are younger than those of the civilian regime.
median age of the former is located in the 1911-1920
decade, while the latter is in the 1901-1910 decade.
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The

Moreover, most of the Chun government cabinet ministers
were b o m as late as the 1921-1930 decade.
Cabinet ministers between the two regimes grew up
under different socio-cultural conditions.

Considering

Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, a median age of 19011910 decade suggests that the civilian government cabinet
ministers were b o m when Korea was still under the tradi
tional Yi dynasty and spent their childhood in the Confucian tradition.

In contrast to the cabinet ministers, the

military government cabinet ministers with a median age of
1921-1930 decade implies that they were b o m and grew up
during the Japanese occupation of Korea.

Furthermore, most

of their early life was spent in the period of independence
movement.

It is natural, therefore, that they acquired a

high degree of nationalistic feelings and their national
istic feelings could have contributed to their later
developmentalist orientation (Kim, 197^s 138-139).
The military government cabinet ministers are more
change-oriented than the civilian government cabinet
ministers.

In the Korean context, age tends to correlate

with one's traditional Confucian orientation.
cian orientation implies conservatism.

The Confu-

It is inimical to

change (Choi, 197^* 20).
Place of Birth
When urban-rural places of birth are compared, Table
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Table 3
Urban-Rural Place of Birth
_______________________________ (percent)
Civilian Regime

Military Regime

Place
Rhee

Chang

Total

Park

Chun

Total

60.9

27.4

50.0

27.8

29.2

37.0

City over
100,000(in 1930)

0.0

9.1

2.9

6.5

12.5

10.0

City of 20,000100,000(in 1930)

4.3

0.0

2.9

5.5

12.5

9.0

34.8

63.6

44.1

60.2

45.8

76.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

(23)

(11)

(3*0

100.0
(108)

(24)

(132)

Seoul

Rural— all
others in Korea
Total
(Base)
Note.

The cases of "no information" are not included in

the computation.

3 shows that more cabinet ministers of the military regime
were born in rural areas than those of the civilian regime.
The percentage of the Seoul-born cabinet ministers declined
from 50.0 percent during 1948-1961 to 37*0 percent during
1963-present.

The most striking differences occurred

between the Rhee and the Park governments.

About seventy

percent of the Rhee cabinet ministers were b o m in Seoul,
whereas 27.8 percent of the Park cabinet ministers were
b o m in the capital city.

Those who were b o m in rural

areas are more socially mobile.

They have directly
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experienced significant changes in their own lives through
the move from rural to urban areas. These experiences could
have made them more acceptable to change (Whang, 1970: 80).
In comparing data for urban-rural places of birth, the
cabinet ministers of the Park government interestingly re
semble those of the Chang administration.

As the following

table shows, however, the Park cabinet ministers are more
representative of different provinces in the country.
Table k shows that Seoul, North and South Kyongsang
privinces are over-represented in all regimes, whereas
North and South Hamgyong provinces and Cheju province are
under-represented.

However, the rank ordering of

provinces in which more than seven.percent of cabinet
ministers were born shows interesting regional differences
among the four regimes (See Table 5)»

Table 5 shows that

in addition to Seoul and Kyongsang province, the Rhee
cabinet ministers come mostly from Chungchong and Kyonggi
provinces; the Chang cabinet ministers from Pyongan and
Cholla provinces, a well-known stronghold of the
Democratic Party, the Park cabinet ministers from Kyonggi
and Chungchong provinces; and the Chun cabinet ministers
from Cholla, Chungchong, Kangwon, and Hwanghae provinces.
Furthermore, according to Table ty, the Park cabinet
ministers come from lk different regional areas, while the
Rhee cabinet ministers come from 12 areas; the Chang
cabinet ministers, 11 areas; and the Chun cabinet
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Table b
Place of Birth by Province
(percent)

Civilian Regime' Military Regime
ri.ace

xoxaj.
Rhee Chang Total

Park

Chun Total

21.9

28.6

12.5

23-3

21.0

25.1

21.5

Kyonggi

9.7

12.2

8.3

11.0

10.7

0.0

9.3

N. Chungchong

5.0

8.2

4.2

6.8

4.5

3.6

4.4

S, Chungchong

9.4

8.2

4.2

6.8

10.7

7.1

10.2

N. Cholla

3.6

4.1

8.3

5.5

3.4

0.0

2.9

S , Cholla

5.4

2.0

8.3

4.1

5.1

10.7

5.9

N. Kyongsang

12.9

8.2

25.0

13.7

11.3

21.4

12.7

S. Kyongsang

11.2

12.2

4.2

9.6

11.3

14.3

11.7

Kangwon

4.3

4.1

0.0

2.7

4.5

7.1

4.9

Cheju

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Hwanghae

4.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

6.2

7.1

6.3

S, Pyongan

3.6

4.1

4.2

4.1

3.4

3.6

3.4

N, Pyongan

4.7

6.1

17.6

9.6

3.4

0.0

2.9

S. Hamgyong

2.2

2.0

0.0

1.4

2.8

0.0

2.4

N. Hamgyong

1.4

0.0

4.2

1.4

1.7

0.0

1.5

Seoul

Total

100.0

(Base)

(278)

Note.

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(49)

(2*0

(73) (177)

(28) (205)

The cases of "no information" are not included in

the computation.
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Table 5
Rand Ordering of Province

Civilian

Regime

Rhee

Chang

Province

%

Province

%

Seoul

28.6

N. Kyongsang

25.0

S. Kyongsang

12.2

N. Pyongan

17.6

Kyonggi

12.2

Seoul

12.5

N. Kyongsang

8.2

Kyonggi

8.3

N. Chungchong

8.2

N. Cholla

8.3

S. Chungchong

8.2

S . Cholla

8.3

Military

Regime

Park
Province

Chun
%

Province

%

Seoul

21.0

Seoul

25.1

N, Kyongsang

11.3

N. Kyongsang

21.4

S. Kyongsang

11.3

S. Kyongsang

14.3

Kyonggi

10.7

S. Cholla

10.7

S. Chungchong

10.7

S. Chungchong

7.1

Kangwon

7.1

Hwanghae

7.1
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ministers, 9 areas.
The above findings show a couple of other interesting
characteristics.

First, most cabinet ministers of both

military and civilian regimes tend to come from the more
heavily populated and relatively urbanized regions of the
country.

The influence of urban life may be more closely

related to one's achievement and career development than
the rural ties (Hahn and Kim, 196^: 29-31)*

Second,

contrary to a common assertion that the Park regime is
governed by people from North Kyongsang province (the home
province of President Park), Park's cabinet ministers show
a more geographical balance in recruitment.

Regional

favoritism in the recruitment of cabinet ministers is more
apparent in the Chang and the Rhee regimes than in the
Park regime (In case of the Chun regime, it is too early
to evaluate) (Kim, 1975* H ) *
Education
Education is generally viewed as an intrinsic good
%
worthy of honour and prestige and as an important
instrument for self-protection, self-gain, and social
mobility.

Particularly in Korea, education is equated

with upward social mobility (Zonis, 1971: 6^5 Kim, 1975s
12).

Table 6 shows that most cabinet ministers in Korea

received at least college or university level education.
It indicates that a higher level of education is crucial
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Table 6
Level of Education
________________
Civilian Regime

(percent)
Military Regime

Level
Rhee

Chang

Total

Park

Chun

Total

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.0

0.5

30.4

9.5

23.9

14.9

9.4

14.0

College or Univ.,b 65.2

85.7

71.6

73.2

46.9

69.0

4.4

4.8

4.5

11.3

43.8

16.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

(46)

(21)

(67)

100.0
(168)

100.0
(200)

Primary or less
Secondary8,

Post-Graduate
Total
(Base)
Note.

(32)

The cases of "no information" are not included in

the computation.
^condary includes Middle School, Technical and Vocational
School, and High School.
^College or University includes Senmon, Some College, and
College or University graduate,

for achievement to a cabinet-level position in South Korea.
Comparing the levels of formal education of cabinet
ministers, however, some significant differences among
regimes are observed.
Of the four regimes, the Chang and the Chun cabinet
ministers are more highly educated; slightly more than 90
percent of both cabinet ministers received at least
college or university level education.

In the Rhee regime,
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about 70 percent of cabinet ministers belong to the highlyeducated group.
fourths.

For the Park cabinet, the figure is three

An outstanding feature of the military regime,

especially the Chun cabinet, reflecting in part the
technocratic and managerial orientations of the regime, is
a high proportion of cabinet ministers with post-graduate
education (See Table 6 ).
Noteworthy differences between civilian and military
regimes are also shown for the place of college or
university education.

According to Table 7 , the largest

group (44.77S) of cabinet ministers of all regimes attended
colleges or universities in Japan, including those who
attended Keijo (Seoul) Imperial University during Japanese
colonial rule.

The second largest group graduated from

Korean (23.4$) and American universities (23.3^).

However,

all cabinet ministers who attended Korean universities
were found among the military regime.

Neither the Rhee

nor the Chang cabinet ministers were educated in Korean
universities.
differences.

Age differences are reflected in these
Korean college or university education is a

post-War phenomenon.

Only following the Liberation, South

Korean colleges or universities have produced a large
number of graduates.

The number of college or university

students was about 8,000 in 1945.

This number has

increased to as many as 500,000 in 1980, a 62-fold
increase.

At the end of 1979» there were 84 four-year
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Table

7

Place of College or University Education
(percent)

Civilian Regime
Place

Military Regime

Total

Seoul Nat'l
Yonsei, Korea
or Ewha Univ.

14.8

Rhee Chang Total

Park

Chun Total

0.0

0.0

12.2

46.9

19.0

0.0

Other Univ.
in Korea

8.6

0.0 . 0.0

0.0

11.5

9.4

11.0

Keijo Imperial
Univ.
(before 1945)

7.6

0.0

11.1

4.3

9.9

3.1

8.6

Imperial Univ.
in Japan
(before 1945)

8.6

10.4

11.1

10.6

9.9

0.0

8.0

Other Univ.
in Japan

28.5

44.8

44.4

44.7

26.7

12.5

23.9

United States
Univ.

23.3

27.6

22.2

25.5

22.1

25.0

22.7

Other Foreign
Univ.

8.6

17.2

11.2

14.9

7.7

3.1

6.8

Total

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

100.0 100.0 100.0

(Base)

(210)

(131)

Note.

(29)

(18)

(47)

(32) (163)

The cases of "no information" are not included in

the computation.
a0ther Foreign University includes college or university
in China, Manchuria, and other foreign countries.
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regular colleges or universities, 100 graduate schools,
11 two-year teachers' colleges and 12? miscellaneous
vacational colleges in South Korea.

The cabinet ministers

of the military regime are the products of post-Liberation
Korean education.

They are more indigenous and less

Western in education than their counterparts of the
civilian regime (Korea Annual, 1980: 208-21^; Kim, 1975*
13).
Between the cabinet ministers of the civilian and the
military regimes, there have been significant generation
changes.

These changes are indicative of a serious

cleavage

between the older generation of political

leadership and the upcoming younger generation (Hahn and
Kim, 196^: 28-29).

As has been shown in Table 2, there is

a progressive decline in the median ages of cabinet
ministers of the four regimes.

The decline appears more

drastic in the case of the military regime's cabinet
ministers.
Occupation
One's occupation plays a major role in his socializa
tion process.

It is a major channel through which one

acquires an experience of the larger world.

The prior

occupations of cabinet ministers are important indicators
showing differences in their job-orientation, values and
attitudes (Quandt, 1970: 182-183; Whang, 1970: 73).
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Table 8
Prior Occupation
__________(percent)

Civilian Regime
Occupation

Military Regime

■
Rhee Chang Total

Park

Chun

Total

Professor

6.3

5.0

6.1

2.8

4.3

4.2

4.3 (4.0)

Liberal
Profession

9.5

5.0

8.7

11.2

5.2

0.0

4.3 (5.7)

16.8

55.0

23.5

0.0

6.9

4.2

6.4 (5.1)

Cabinet Post 14.7

25.0

16.5

2.8 30.2

45.8

32.9(26.7)

Bureaucrat

43.2

10.0

37.4

27.8 39.7

25.1

37.1(35.2)

Military

6.3

0.0

5.2

55.6

6.9

8.3

7.1(17.0)

Business0

3.2

0.0

2.6

0.0

6.9

8.3

7.1 (5.7)

Othersd

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.2

0.8 (0 .6)

Politician*5

Total
(Base)
Note.

100.0 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0.
100.0
(100.0 )
(l40)(176)
(24)
(20)
(115) (36)e (136)
(95)
The cases of "no information" are not included in

the computation.
«.
liberal Profession includes professional and technical
careers - educators, bankers, lawyers, medical doctors,
journalists, engineers, etc.
^Politician includes political party career and National
Assemblyman.
cBusiness includes self-employed businessman and public
enterprise managerial position.
^Others include farmers, laborers, etc.
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Table 8 (Continued)

eBase o f 36 means the period o f military junta (I 96I - 63 ).
*P
Base of 176 includes cabinet ministers of military junta
period (1961-63).

Table 8 shows that a largest proportion of cabinet
ministers in all regimes had bureaucratic backgrounds.

A

significant difference between civilian and military
regimes exists, however.

The military origins of the Park

and the Chun cabinets, as well as their administrative
backgrounds and technocratic experiences, are clearly born
out.

In the military regime, unlike the previous civilian

regimes, as many as one fifth of its cabinet ministers are
recruited from the ranks of professional military officers.
Particularly, during the military junta period (1961-63),
55.6 percent of the cabinet ministers had a military
background, whereas no military was represented in the
Chang cabinet.

The military oriented personnel in the

Park cabinet clearly stood for efficiency and rationality
in government.

The military is often the most modern,,

institution in the Third World developing societies
(Whang, 1970: 76; Kim, 1981.- 12).
Table 8 also shows that cabinet ministers of the
military regime are more non-politically oriented than
those of the civilian regime.

The Chun cabinet ministers

tend to be the least political of ministers in the four
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cabinet.

The recruitment of political party leaders and

national assemblymen has been minimal in the Chun regime.
Most political are the Chang cabinet ministers - more than
one half of them had party or national assembly careers.
In the Rhee cabinet, about one fifth of the cabinet minis
ters had political party or national assembly careers.

For

the Park cabinet ministers, this figure is less than one
tenth.
Table 8 also shows that the number of Western-educated
professors among the cabinet ministers has gradually
increased in proportion to those of liberal profession.

If

these two groups are compared, the percentage of college
professors is 39 •9 percent for the Rhee cabinet whereas
that figure is 100.0 percent for the Chun cabinet.

There

is no liberal profession is represented in the Chun cabinet
other than college professors.

In addition, one of the

interesting findings of this table is an increase in the
percentage of prior cabinet-post background.

About 33

percent of cabinet ministers of the military regime had
ptior cabinet minister positions, while the figure is less
than one fifth for cabinet ministers of the civilian regime.
These trends represent more administrative-orientation
of the military regime.

The cabinet ministers of the

military regime appear more familiar with the techniques
of modern management and programming than those of the
civilian regime.
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Patterns of Cabinet Minister Recruitment
One of the basic assumptions in this section is that
the social background study of cabinet ministers will show
the recruitment patterns of task elites by political
leaders.

The above discussion thus far has shown that

there are significant differences between cabinet
ministers of the civilian and the military regime in terms
of their social backgrounds as well as their values and
developmental orientations.

The assumption is that the

values and attitudes of task elites are identical with
the values and attitudes of their political leaders
because the political leaders' values and developmental
orientations determine the patterns of or the criteria
for the recruitment of their task elites.

In this respect,

it seems reasonable to infer that the political leaders
have brought about changes in the patterns of or the
criteria for the recruitment of cabinet ministers in order
to make them responsive to their values and developmental
orientations.

The following is a summary of major

differences in the recruitment of cabinet ministers in
South Korea's civilian and military regimes.
1.

The cabinet ministers of the military regime are

younger than those of the civilian regime.

Since 1961,

the recruitment pattern has been changed and the younger
generation task elites have been recruited urider the
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influence of change-oriented political leaders.
2.

Most cabinet ministers of all regimes come from

the more heavily populated and relatively urbanized
regions of the country.

However, the cabinet ministers

of the military regime were b o m more in rural areas and
represented more provinces than those of the civilian
regime.

The criteria for task elite recruitment has been

more achievement-oriented and more change-oriented since

1961.
3.

The attainment of higher education is an absolute

prerequisite for advancement to a cabinet-level position.
Most of the cabinet ministers received at least college or
university education.

However, the cabinet ministers of

the military regime are more highly educated and more
technically oriented than those of the civilian regime.
They received more post-graduate education.

Furthermore,

higher education in South Korea has become progressively
Korean oriented and most cabinet ministers of the
military regime received higher education in Korea whereas
none of the cabinet ministers of the civilian regime
received such Korean education.

The task elite recruit

ment pattern has become more technocratic-oriented and
national-oriented since 1961.
A significant number of former civil!servants
are found among the cabinet ministers of all regimes.
However, there are some outstanding features of the
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cabinet ministers of the military regime as compared with
the cabinet ministers of the civilian regime.

For

instance, 1) more of them have a military background; 2)
more of them are transferred horizontally from one
ministry to another; and 3) more of them are recruited
ftom the academic field.

The military-oriented cabinet

ministers are basically administrative and action-oriented.
The university professors also represent one of the new
and m o d e m social forces particularly since the i960
Student and the 1961 Military Revolution.

These

professors are on the whole young and have been exposed
to the West.
is related

Re-recruitment of former cabinet ministers
to

the task orientation of political leaders.

On the whole, compared with the cabinet ministers of
the civilian regime, the cabinet ministers of the military
regime seem to reflect more closely the values and
developmental orientations of political leaders for
national development.

Since the military assumption of

power in South Korea in 1961, the pattern of elite
recruitment has become more achievement-oriented, more
change-oriented, more future-oriented, and more overseasoriented.
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CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND
THE PATTERNS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The basic assumption of the third hypothesis is that
changes in political leaders' values and attitudes and in
their task elites recruitment patterns will bring about
corresponding changes in the patterns of national develop
ment.

To test the above hypothesis, this chapter will

discuss the different patterns of economic development
under the various South Korean regimes and highlight
differences between the military and the civilian regimes.
Comparison will be made particularly regarding resource
allocation and various other action programs.
Resource Allocation
In Chapter III, it was shown that the political
leaders of the civilian regime emphasized national unifi
cation and military expansion as their goals, while those
of the military regime stressed national development
through planned economic development.

These differences

in leadership values and attitudes contributed to
different priorities in the allocation of budgetary
resources in South Korea.
Table 9 shows that more budgetary resources have been
82
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Table 9
Governmental Expenditure
_______________________________ (percent)
General
Expense

Defense
Program

1957

43.0

31.0

26.0

1958

43.0

31.0

26.0

1959

48.0

34.0

18.0

1960

48.0

34.0

18.0

1961

40.0

28.0

32.0

1962

37.0

25.0

38.0

1963

42.0

25.0

33.0

1964

42.0

30.0

28.0

1965

42.0

29.0

29.0

1966

41.0

24.0

35-0

1967

46.8

27.4

25.5

1968

44.4

24.3

30.7

1969

41.5

22.8

35.5

1970

43.1

23.2

33.7

1971

43.8

24.4

30.7

1972

40.8

24.8

34.3

1973

30.1

18.5

48.4

1974

27.6

17.3

55.1

1975

29.8

20.9

49.2

1976

22.1

32.7

45.2

1977

22.3

33.8

43.9

Fiscal Year

Economic
Program
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Table 9 (Continued)

General
Expense

Defense
Program

1978

21.6

35.6

42.8

1979

21.0

3^.4

44.6

1980

20.1

35.8

45.1

1981

20.2

35.3

44.5

1957-1960(x)
196I-198I(x)

45.5
34.4

33.0
27.2

22.0

Fiscal Year

Source:

Economic
Program

38.3

Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1959-81, and Korea

Annual, 1964-1981.
Note. Data from the fiscal year of 1948-56 is not
available,

allocated to economic programs than to defense programs
since the fiscal year of 1961.

During the fiscal years of

1957-60, the average percentage of expenditures for
defense programs to the total government expenditures was
33.0 percent, while the average percentage of the economic
programs was 22.0 percent.

However, during the fiscal

years of I96I-8I, the average percentage of expenditures
for defense programs to the total budget expenditures has
dropped from the level of 33.0 percent to 27.2 percent,
while the average percentage of economic program
expenditures has increased from 22.0 percent to 38.3
percent.
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Table 10

Consumption, Investment & Foreign Aid

Foreign Aid
Year

Consumption
<*)

Investment
m

% of GNP

Amount
($1,000:

1948

179.593

194-9

116,509

1950

58,706

1951

106,542

1952

161,327

1953

89.1

10.9

5.3

194,170

1954

87.5

12.5

4.3

153,925

1955

88.0

12.0

6.5

236,707

1956

93.0

7.0

12.3

326,705

1957

86.5

13.5

10.6

382,893

1958

88.0

12.0

9.3

321,272

1959

90.0

10.0

6.2

222,204

i960

90.7

10.0

6.6

245,393

1961

88.6

12.1

8.4

199,245

1962

88.9

11.8

8.6

232,310

1963

84.1

16.6

6.3

216,446

1964

85.4

13.1

5.7

149,331

1965

87.1

14.1

6.3

131,441

1966

81.3

19.9

5.3

103,261

1967

81.5

20,1

4.4

97,018
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Table 10 (Continued)

Foreign Aid
Consumption
(*)

Year

Investment

w

% of GNP

Amount
($1,000)

1968

76.4 '

23.3

3.^

105,856

1969

73.4

26.1

3.0

107,264

1970

75.6

24.5

1.9

82,636

1971

76.4

22.8

1.6

51,217

1972

80.1

20.6

1.6

5,089

1973

73.7

24.7

1.4

2,146

70.7

27.6

1.0

982

1975

73.7

26.6

1.1

1,155

1976

75.1

24.9

1.2

1,740

1977

74.4

27.1

0.6

948

1978

71.3

30.1

1.0

169

197^

'

224

1979
Sources Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1959-1981.
Note. Data from the period of 1948-1952 and 1979-1981
are not available.

Table 10 deals with the pattern of disposition of
available resources between government consumption and
investment.

The trend of government investment to the

total available resources declined during 1953-1960, while
the percentage of government consumption increased.

At
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the time, the economic programs of the civilian regime
were highly dependent on the situational and political
changes.

A regressive motivation in politics and

administration became dominant in the 1953-60 period:
instead of utilizing the legal framework for political,
social, and economic development of the country, the
civilian political leadership at the time chose to exploit
it for their own political purposes; instead of moving
forward toward the future, they satisfied themselves with
exploitation of the present; and instead of adding to the
momentum of recovery hitherto attained and directing it
toward further growth, they chose to concentrate on
consumption.

The result was that they neglected the long-

range development of the economy and relied on extravagant
public consumption to gain popularity (Lee, 1968: 99-101).
Since 1961, however, the table shows that allocation to
governmental investment has been increasing.

The

distribution of resources became a purposive and planned
process.

The military regime seems to have given

priorities to long-term investment for economic growth
rather than current consumption.
Table 10 also shows an interesting relationship
between government investment and foreign aid.

During

the fiscal years of .195^-1960, the amount of government
investment and foreign aid seems to show a positive
relationship.

The civilian regime at the time viewed
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economic development as an extension of economic stabili
zation and recovery based on foreign aid.

During the

period from 19^8 to i960, South Korea received 2.7 billion
dollars of U.S. grant aid.

A large-scale infusion of

foreign aid made it possible for the South Korean economy
to rebuild the war damaged productive facilities, but it
did not provide any basic long-term development projects
and failed to develop such basic industries as electricity,
coal, fertilizer, and cement.

Furthermore, all or almost

all of the raw materials, consumer goods, imported grains,
and foodstuffs imported were purchased with foreign aid
funds, making the South Korean economy totally dependent
on foreign aid (Park, 1970: 25-51* 171-17^5 Korea Annual,
1980i 108-109).

Since 1961, however, South Korea has

become less dependent on foreign aid.

Table 10 shows that

the percentage of government investment has increased
since 1961, while the amount of foreign aid has declined.
These changes seem to show a more self-supporting economy
for South Korea and planned allocation of government
budget for further industrialization and development.
Action Programs
Different values and developmental orientations
between the civilian and the military regimes in South
Korea have brought about different action programs and
different capacities to

initiate, guide, and sustain
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actions leading to national development.

The different

action programs to be investigated include*

1) short-

range or long-range programs! 2) domestic or overseas
programs; and 3) intra-ministerial or inter-ministerial
programs.

Short-range or long-range programs mean the

number of years during which a program is operated and/or
effective.

Domestic or overseas programs are the number

of countries and international organizations involved in
the programs.

Intra-ministerial or inter-ministerial

programs are viewed as the number of ministries involved
in the formulation and implementation of the programs.
Involvement is also defined in terms of the special
conferences and committee meetings held for the purpose
of coordination (Whang, 1970: 106).
Long-range Programs
The projection of positive future images is one of
the important aspects of political leadership for national
development, for instance, in the form of long-range
economic development programs which suggest courses of
action for the future.

In this section, a long-range

program is defined as a program which is to be operative
over a period of five-years or longer.
As earlier stated, the South Korean civilian political
leadership before 1961 possessed an escapist or exploitationist time orientation, which was translated into
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Bhort-range programs.

During the period of the civilian

regime, most of the economic programs tended to follow
the annual cycle of the budgetary process.

There were few

budgetary appropriations of continuous expenditure type
beyond the annual budget period.

What development plans

there were such as the Rhee regime's Three-year Economic
Development Plan and the Chang regime's Five-year Economic
Development Plan were never implemented due respectively
to the i960 Student and the 1961 Military Revolution.
Since the military assumed power in 1961, however, a
considerable number of long-range programs have been
formulated and implemented.

The First Five-year Economic

Development Plan was formulated in 1961, and it was
followed by the other five-year plans through 1981.

The

regime also implemented various other long-range programs
such as the Seven-year Food Grain Production Plan (196771), the Five-year Technical Development Plan (1962-66),
the Five-year Electricity Development Plan (1962-66), and
the Ten-year Land Development Plan (1967-76).

Furthermore,

some programs encompassed more than a decade.

For

instance, the "Saemaul Movement" was launched in 1971 as
a continuous pan-national development program and a long
term education plan (1979-1991) was announced on November
22, 1978 (Korea Annual, 1980j 192-193t 208-21^; Park,
1979

,

67-88; Whang, 1970*. 110-112).
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Overseas Programs
When the national economy grows, political leader
ship's overseas commitment tends to expand and bring about
overseas-oriented economic policies such as foreign trade
policies, including export promotion policies.

Rapid

economic development in the less development countries of
the world generally depends on favorable international
economic environments as well as domestic economic condi
tions.

In this regard, the ratio of the overseas programs

to the total economic development plans is an important
indicator of political leadership's performance for
national development.
During the civilian regimes of President Rhee and
Premier Chang in South Korea, their main economic objec
tives were:

l) rebuild the infrastructure and industrial

capacity that had been destroyed by the Korean War? 2)
maintain strong military forces to forestall any new
attacks from the North; and 3) improve the private
consumption levels within the limits of domestic produc
tion and available foreign assistance.

These objectives

called for high levels of investment and of government and
private consumption.

But, the Rhee regime emphasized

eventual reunification of South and North Korea.

President

Rhee was hopeful that unification would give access to the
electric power and heavier industries of the North.
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He

was unwilling to build up the South as an independent and
integrated economy.

He tried only to cope with immediate

and short-run problems of security, hunger, and survival,
and sought to mobilize additional resources by maximizing
foreign aid.

Once again his values and attitudes toward

national economic problems were basically domestic-oriented
(Cole and Lyman, 1971s 164-170).
Before 1961 in South Korea, the mobilization of human
and material resources for the management of and actions
involved in the economic programs were limited within the
national territory, and the dominant source of foreign
exchange was foreign aid.

During 1953-1960, the average

percentage of export and import to GNP was only 1.7 percent
and 11.5 percent respectively.

Nearly all of the exports

were primary products such as tungsten, graphite, copper,
kaolin, and talc, while major imports were food grains and
manufactured goods.

Most of the imports were financed by

foreign aid grants from the United Nations Korea Recon
struction Agency (UNKRA), which provided relief through
the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea
(UNCACK) during the Korean War, and the United States
bilateral assistance program.

Between 1954 and i960,

foreign assistance financed more than 70 percent of the
total South Korean imports.

From 1956 to 1958, the imports

financed by U.S. aid exceeded 80 percent of the total
imports.

About 74 percent of the government investment

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was financed by foreign aid during 1953-1960 (Frank, Jr.
et al, 1975* 10-15; Jones and Sakong, 1980: 92).
In contrast to the civilian regime of South Korea,
the political leadership of the military regime was more
overseas-oriented and its economic programs emphasized
export expansion and foreign investment.
When the First Five-year Economic Development Plan
was launched in 1961, the resource endowment and the
domestic market became critical for rapid economic
growth, because natural resources and capital goods were
quite scarce, and the domestic market of the economy was
limited.

Thus, the political leadership of the military

regime considered export expansion and foreign investment
as the optimum solution to meet those problems (Whang,
1970: 112-117).
To expand exports, the military regime enacted many
economic reforms and extended various conveniences to the
business sector.

A new budget and an Export Cooperation

Law were enforced, and various tax laws were revised to
increase domestic tax revenues and business internal
savings.

At the same time, there was organized

Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA).

a

Korea

The government also

conducted various overseas publicity activities and
provided its good offices for trade transactions and
development of overseas markets, and it participated in
various overseas fairs often sponsoring them.

South
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Korea's diplomatic relations also expanded.

In 1978,

South Korea had diplomatic relations with 122 countries
compared to only 1? countries in 1950*

The expanded

activities of the overseas branches of KOTRA have also
contributed to increase in export (Park, 1970: 76; Frank,
Jr. et al, 1975* 15-17? Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979*
4-71) •
To promote foreign investment, economic cooperation
with foreign countries and/or international organizations
has been emphasized.

Starting with the International

Cooperative Group for Korea (IEC0K) in 1965» South Korea
became a member of the trustee board of the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) in 1966, and took an active part in
a number of meetings organized by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (ESCAP).

In addition, the government

held a series of governmental and non-governmental-talks
with various countries for the conclusion of commercial
treaties.

Furthermore, the government pursued the

introduction of foreign private capital from several
private foreign lenders, particularly Japanese capital
following the normalization of relationship between the
two countries.

The military government adopted new laws

to encourage foreign investment and to provide guarantees
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of repayment to foreign lenders.

As a result, commercial

loans from abroad grew tremendously in the mid-1960s.
Under the leadership of President Park, South Korea became
an exporting nation.

Exports in 1961 totaled only $4-0

million, but they jumped above $15 billion in 1979.

In

1955» South Korea exported to 18 countries but, in 1979t
she exported to 14-2 countries (Korea Annual, 1980s 136144, 151-158} Cole and Lyman, 1971: 181-186, 228).
Inter-Ministerial Programs

To meet the problems of national development is an
complex

undertaking

and the various ministries concerned

have overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities.
Economic development programs require highly coordinated
actions and cooperative efforts among the ministries, and
since 1961 South Korea has had various inter-ministerial
programs across the jurisdictional lines of the existing
ministries.

In this regard, the ratio of the inter-

ministerial programs to the total development programs
should be regarded as an indicator of political leadership
role in stimulating national development.
During 194-8-1960, according to one study, 76 percent
of the total economic programs were implemented by a
single ministry, while, during I96I-I966, only 4-0 percent
was handled by individual ministries (Whang, 1970: 17-18).
In fact, during the Rhee regime, one-man dictatorship,
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cabinet instability, and insecurity of tenure made it
impossible for cabinet ministers to take concerted
decision-making for national development, and maintenance
of the status quo was their substantive concern.

There

were some exceptional cases such as the Five-year Coal
Production in 1955 and the National Construction Service
(NCS) program in i960, but they experienced limited
effectiveness due to meagre budget allocation and the 1961
Military Revolution (Wade and Kim, 1978: 21-24-; Lee, 1968:
82-84-, 130-133).
Unlike the civilian leaders, the military leaders
were able to utilize their experiences with staff organi
zations and they were able to transform the relationship
between political leaders and task elites from a one-way
flow of influence to a two-way mutual interaction.
Furthermore, many intellectuals and former cabinet
ministers were recruited into the military cabinets and
they seemed to have contributed to easy communications
among cabinet ministers and cooperative and coordinated
action programs across ministries.

In addition to the

National Service Program, which was initially designed by
the Chang regime, most of the new programs such as
consecutive Five-year Economic Development Plans and
export promotion programs have been formulated as interministerial programs (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 48} Whang,
1970* 117-122, 14-6-14-7).
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For economic planning under the military leadership,
the Economic Planning Board (EPB) is organized as the
chief of the national planning agency and enjoys both
budget and planning functions as well as responsibilities
for foreign investment.

The EPB also coordinates and

controls activities of various economic ministries.

The

military regime also established various special
committees for better coordination among ministries.
The committees include the Economic Ministers' Conference,
Vice-Ministers' Conference, Economic-Science Council,
Office of Planning and Coordination, and Government and
Ruling Party Joint Meeting.

Furthermore, for better

coordination among government, entrepreneurs, and the
public, the Central Economic Committee was established,
consisting of the Prime Minister as chairman, the Minister
of EPB as vice chairman, all ministers concerned with
economic affairs, and a few outside experts such as
professors, journalists, and representatives of business
associations (Jones and Sakong, 1980: ^8-^9; Wade and Kim,
1978s 223-227).
The export promotion programs have also become an
inter-ministerial program.

Since 1965* the Monthly Export

Promotion Meeting chaired by the President has been a
forum of multi-faceted information exchange.

It consists

of all economic ministers as well as the Ministers of
Culture and Information and Foreign Affairs, leaders of
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the Ruling Party, and representatives from business
associations, banking institutions, and the KOTRA.

In

addition, various advisory committees were newly organized
or strengthened.

Twenty-nine of these advisory committees

were in the Ministry of Finance; 27 in the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry; 16 in the Ministry of Home Affairs;
15 in the Ministry of Education; Ik in the Ministry of
National Defense; 11 in the Economic Planning Board; 10 in
the Ministry of Transportation; and 9 in the Ministry of
Communication.

These advisory committees represent the

demands and opinions of various and relevant groups in
the policy-making and implementation process, and perform
an important communication function by articulating
government policy to their constituents (Jones and Sakong,
1980: 97! Wade and Kim, 1978: 216-217).
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Findings
This thesis has attempted quantitatively to establish
a positive relationship between political leadership and
national development in South Korea during the period from
19^8 to 1982.

The central hypothesis of the thesis is

that political leadership is the ultimate determinant of
South Korea's success with national development.

To

evaluate such a relationship, the following set of sub
hypotheses has been investigated:

1) political leader

ship is a critical variable in national development; 2 )
there is a significant association between social back
grounds of task elites (cabinet ministers) and elite
recruitment patterns of political leaders; and 3) there is
a significant relationship between the values and
attitudes of political leadership and the patterns of
national development.

To facilitate this study,

furthermore, the five republics which South Korea has had
were divided into two types of regimes:

civilian regime

(the First and the Second Republics).and military regime
(the Third, the Fourth, and the Fifth Republics).
To test the first hypothesis, Chapter II analyses

99
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the origin, nature, and purpose of national development in
South Korea, focusing on the political leadership's
performances on political stability and socio-economic
development.
1.

To summarize the findings of Chapter II:

Since the inception of republican experience in

South Korea in 1948, South Korea has had eight constitu
tional changes and five different republics.

Following

the constitutional changes, the political pendulum has
swung back and forth three times:

from a representative-

oriented system to an executive-dominant system (19481960); reemergence of a representative-dominant model
(1960-1961)} and reappearance of the executive-controled
system since 1961.

But the peaceful transfer of power

has been notably absent in South Korean politics.

However,

South Korea has experienced political development since
1948.

M o d e m political institutions and processes were

introduced.

Particularly since 1961, South Korea's

political system has rapidly gained in stability under the
highly centralized government.

The political stability

has significantly contributed to modernistic national
development.
2.

Economic development in South Korea connotes far

more than changes in the usual complex of economic
indicators.

During the civilian regime, economic recovery

and stabilization was emphasized.

Since 1961, however,

modernization through planned economic development has
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become a full-fledged political symbol of the military
regime and the country has experienced rapid industriali
zation and economic development.

South Korea has been

able to shed the old image of a 'have-not' and 'not-viable'
politico-economic entity and become a showcase among the
developing countries in bringing about a rapid socio
economic development and political stability.
As seen in Chapter II, however, the records of
various regimes have varied.

Their differences in

achievement are a function of different political leader
ships caused by changes in their values and attitudes and
the consequent changes in their elite recruitment and
policy emphasis.

The second and the third sub-hypotheses

are to investigate these differences.
Chapter III compares different values and development
orientations of the political leaders between the civilian
and the military regimes.

Their values and attitudes

determine the patterns of their task elites recruitment
and national development.
When political leaders' values and attitudes between
the two types of regimes were compared using the timeorientation approach, it was found that President Park
Chung Hee was more developmentalist-oriented than either
President Syngman Rhee or Premier Chang Myun.

Comparing

more specifically their orientations in the following
areas such as achievement orientation, change orientation,
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future orientation, and overseas orientation, here again
noteworthy differences among them were found.

President

Rhee and Premier Chang emphasized national unity and
unification, and democracy respectively, while President
Park emphasized national development through planned
economic development.

Their different policy priorities

for national development determined their major courses of
political actions.

The conclusions of Chapter III are

that the values and developmental orientations of
President Park were more acheivement-oriented, more
change-oriented, more future-oriented, and more overseasoriented to achieve his goals than those of civilian
political leaders.
To test the second hypothesis, Chapter IV analyses
the social backgrounds of cabinet ministers in terms of
such variables as Year of Birth, Place of Birth (Province,
Urban/Rural), level of Education, Place of College or
University Education, and Prior Occupation.

The analysis

shows some significant differences between cabinet
ministers of the two regimes. Their values and developa
mental orientations seem also to differ. The major
differences between them could be summarized as follows:
1.

The cabinet ministers of the military regime are

younger than those of the civilian regime, and they are
more change-oriented.
2.

The cabinet ministers of the military regime were
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b o m more in rural areas and come from a greater variety
of provinces than those of the civilian regime and they
are more achievement-oriented and more change oriented
than their counterparts in the civilian regime.
3.

More cabinet ministers of the military regime

received post-graduate education and education in Korea,
and they are more technocratic-oriented and more nationaloriented.
b.

The cabinet ministers of the military regime are

more frequently recruited from professional military
officers, former cabinet ministers, and college or
universities professors than those of the civilian regime.
The military government cabinet ministers seem more
administrative-oriented, more technocratic-oriented, and
more managerial-oriented than political-oriented.
With regard to national development, these findings
show that the cabinet ministers of the military regime
tend to reflect more closely their political leaders'
values and developmental orientations.

They seem to

illustrate also that since.1961 the pattern of cabinet
ministers recruitment has become more achievement-oriented,
more change-oriented, more future-oriented, and more
overseas-oriented.
The third hypothesis deals with the relationship
between different values and developmental orientations of
different political leaderships and the national
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development process.
1.

In this connection, Chapter V finds:

The different leadership values and attitudes

between the two regimes are reflected in the budgetary
allocation between defense and economic programs and
between government consumption and investment.

As might

be expected, during the military regime, the percentage of
expenditure for economic programs to the total government
expenditures increased and the percentage of government
investment bacame greater.

The change represents the

military regime's commitment to the self-supporting
economy, and planned allocation of government budget.
2.

The different leadership values and attitudes

between the two regimes contribute to different action
programs such as short-range or long-range programs,
domestic or overseas programs, and intra-ministerial or
inter-ministerial programs.

Chapter V shows that the

patterns of national development has changed from shortrange to long-range programs, from domestic to overseas
programs, and from intra-ministerial to inter-ministerial
programs under the political leadership of the military
regime.
Postscripts
i

It is generally understood that the role of political
leadership is the most crucial factor to be ascertained
in the process of national development.

However, as
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Tsurutani pointed out, most of the political leadership
studies have failed to contribute to a clear understanding
of the relationship between the role of political leader
ship in the process of national development and their
values and attitudes.

Instead, dominant focus of these

studies has been on the structure and recruitment patterns
of political elites.

Other studies have been concerned

with the decision-making processes of political elites
(Tsurutani, 1973* 23-2*0.

This study is in part an answer

to the above shortcomings.
To do this study more satisfactorily, however,
information about the cabinet ministers' socio-economic
origins, religions, language skills, training and travel
abroad, etc. is needed in addition to age, place of
birth, education, and prior occupation.

In addition, as

part of the political leadership in South Korea, the study
could have been expanded to include an analysis of national
assemblymen, supreme court justices, and service chiefs of
the armed forces.
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